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 A fairly complete bibliography will be found in J. N. Larned, Literature of American History (Boston, 1902), and useful lists in Ropes, op. cit., and in the Cambridge Modern History, vol. vii. p. 812. For biographies, memoirs and general works, see the lists appended to the various biographical articles and to the articles and.

 AMERICAN LAW. The laws of the various states and territories of the United States rest at bottom on the same foundation as those of England, namely, the English common law as it existed at the beginning of the 17th century. (See .) The only exceptions worth noting are to be found in the state of Louisiana, the territory of New Mexico, and the acquisitions following the Spanish war of 1898. Those derive most of their law from France or Spain, and thus remotely from the principles of Roman jurisprudence. A part also, but comparatively a small part, of the law of Texas, Missouri, Arizona and the Pacific states comes from similar sources. The United States as a whole has no common law, except so far as its courts have followed the rules of English common-law procedure in determining their own. Most of the positive law of the United States comes from the several states. It is the right of each state to regulate at its pleasure the general relations of persons within its territory to each other, as well as all rights to property subject to its jurisdiction. Each state has also its own system of adjective law. The trial courts of the United States of original jurisdiction follow in general the practice of the state in which they sit as to procedure in cases of common-law character. As to that in equity, or what means the same thing, chancery causes, they follow in general the practice of the English court of chancery as it existed towards the close of the 18th century, when the original Judiciary Act of the United States was adopted. The public statutes of the United States are to be found in the Revised Statutes of 1873, and in the succeeding volumes of the Statutes at Large, enacted by each Congress. Those of each state and territory are printed annually or biennially as they are enacted by each legislature, and are commonly revised every fifteen or twenty years, the revision taking the place of all former public statutes, and being entitled Revised Statutes, General Statutes, or Public Laws. The private or special laws of each state, so far as such legislation is permitted by its constitution, are in some states published separately, and made the subject of similar compilations or revisions; in others they are printed with the public session laws. American courts are often given power by statute to make rules of procedure which have the force of laws. Municipal subdivisions of a state generally have authority from the legislature to make ordinances or by-laws on certain subjects, having the character of a local law, with appropriate sanctions, commonly by fine or forfeiture.

Law in the United States has been greatly affected by the results of the Civil War. During its course (1861–1865) the powers of the president of the United States may be said to have been re-defined by the courts. It was its first civil war, and thus for the first time the exercise of the military authority of the United States within a state which had not sought its aid became frequent and necessary. Next followed the amendments of the Constitution of the United States having for their special purpose the securing beyond question of the permanent abolition of slavery and the civil and political rights of the coloured race. At the outset the Supreme Court of the United States was inclined to treat them as having a very limited operation in other directions. One of the provisions of the XIVth Amendment is that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The benefit of this guarantee was claimed by the butchers of New Orleans, in contending against a monopoly in respect of the slaughter of cattle granted by the state of Louisiana to a single corporation. Their suit was dismissed by the Supreme Court in 1873, with the expression of a doubt whether any action of a state not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, would ever be held to come within the purview of the provision in question. The chief justice and three of his associates dissented from the judgment, holding that the XIVth Amendment did protect the citizens of the United States against the deprivation of their common rights by state legislation. Public sentiment supported the view of the minority, and it was not long before changes in the personnel of the court, occurring in common course, led it to the same conclusions. The protection of the XIVth Amendment is now invoked before it more frequently than is that afforded by any other article of the Constitution. In one of its recent terms twenty-one cases of this nature were decided. Very few of them related to the negro. Since the decision in the Slaughter-House Cases, the controversies as to the constitutional rights of the negro have been comparatively infrequent, but there has been a great and steadily increasing number in all the courts in the country, involving questions of discrimination in favour of or against particular individuals, or of changes affecting the rights of parties in the accustomed forms of judicial procedure.

Down to 1868, when this amendment was adopted, it was, as to most matters, for the state alone to settle the civil rights and immunities of those subject to its jurisdiction. If they were to be free from arbitrary arrests, secure in liberty and property, equal in privilege and entitled to an impartial administration, it was because the constitution of the state so declared. Now they have the guarantee of the United States that the state shall never recede from these obligations. This has readjusted and reset the whole system of the American law of personal rights.

The Supreme Court of the United States has used the great power thus confided to it with moderation. Its general rules of decision are well stated in these words of Mr Justice Brown, found in one of its recent opinions:—

“In passing upon the validity of legislation, attacked as contrary to the XIVth Amendment, it has not failed to recognize the fact that the law is, to a certain extent, a progressive science; that in some of the states methods of procedure, which at the time the constitution was adopted were deemed essential to the protection and safety of the people or to the liberty of the citizen, have been found to be no longer necessary; that restrictions which had formerly been laid upon the conduct of individuals, or of classes of individuals, had proved detrimental to their interests; while, upon the other hand, certain other classes of persons, particularly those engaged in dangerous or unhealthful employments, have been found to be in need of additional protection. Even before the adoption of the constitution, much had been done toward mitigating the severity of the common law, particularly in the administration of its criminal branch. The number of capital crimes, in this country at least, had been largely decreased. Trial by ordeal and by battle had never existed here, and had fallen into disuse in England. The earlier practice of the common law, which denied the benefit of witnesses to a person accused of felony, had been abolished by statute, though, so far as it deprived him of the assistance of counsel and compulsory process for the attendance of his witnesses, it had not been changed in England. But, to the credit of her American colonies, let it be said that so oppressive a doctrine had never obtained a foothold there. The 19th century originated legal reforms of no less importance. The whole fabric of special pleading, once thought to be necessary to the elimination of the real issue between the parties, has crumbled to pieces. The ancient tenures of real estate have been largely swept away, and land is now transferred almost as easily and cheaply as personal property. Married women have been emancipated from the control of their husbands, and placed upon a practical equality with them with respect to the acquisition, possession and transmission of property. Imprisonment for debt has been abolished. Exemptions from executions have been largely added to, and in most of the states homesteads are rendered incapable of seizure and sale upon forced process. Witnesses are no longer incompetent by reason of interest, even though they be parties to the litigation. Indictments have been simplified, and an indictment for the most serious of crimes is now the simplest of all. in several of the states grand juries, formerly the only safeguard against a malicious prosecution, have been largely abolished, and in others the rule of unanimity, so far as applied to civil cases, has given way to verdicts rendered by a three-fourths majority. This case does not call for an expression of opinion as to the wisdom of these changes, or their validity under the XIVth Amendment, although the substitution of prosecution by information in lieu of indictment was recognized as valid in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516. They are mentioned only for the purpose of calling attention to the probability that other changes of no less importance may be made in the future, and that while the cardinal principles of justice are immutable, the methods by which justice