Page:EB1911 - Volume 01.djvu/380

Rh by all the parties to the Act of Berlin. Lord Salisbury further stated that “Her Majesty’s government cannot recognize Portuguese sovereignty in territory not occupied by her in sufficient strength to enable her to maintain order, protect foreigners and control the natives.” To this Portugal replied that the doctrine of effective occupation was expressly confined by the Berlin Act to the African coast, but at the same time expeditions were hastily despatched up the Zambezi and some of its tributaries to discover traces of former Portuguese occupation. Matabeleland and the districts of Lake Nyasa were specially mentioned in the British protest as countries in which Her Majesty’s government took a special interest. As a matter of fact the extension of British influence northwards to the Zambezi had engaged the attention of the British authorities ever since the appearance of Germany in South-West Africa and the declaration of a British protectorate over Bechuanaland. There were rumours of German activity in Matabeleland, and of a Boer trek north of the Limpopo. Hunters and explorers had reported in eulogistic terms on the rich goldfields and healthy plateau lands of Matabeleland and Mashonaland, over both of which countries a powerful chief, Lobengula, claimed authority. There were many suitors for Lobengula’s favours; but on the 11th of February 1888 he signed a treaty with J. S. Moffat, the assistant commissioner in Bechuanaland, the effect of which was to place all his territory under British protection. Both the Portuguese and the Transvaal Boers were chagrined at this extension of British influence. A number of Boers attempted unsuccessfully to trek into the country, and Portugal opposed her ancient claims to the new treaty. She contended that Lobengula’s authority did not extend over Mashonaland, which she claimed as part of the Portuguese province of Sofala.

Meanwhile preparations were being actively made by British capitalists for the exploitation of the mineral and other resources of Lobengula’s territories. Two rival syndicates obtained, or claimed to have obtained, concessions from Lobengula; but in the summer of 1889 Cecil Rhodes succeeded in amalgamating the conflicting interests, and on the 29th of October of that year the British government granted a charter to the British South Africa Company (see .) The first article of the charter declared that “the principal field of the operations” of the company “shall be the region of South Africa lying immediately to the north of British Bechuanaland, and to the north and west of the South African Republic, and to the west of the Portuguese dominions.” No time was lost in making preparations for effective occupation. On the advice of F. C. Selous it was determined to despatch an expedition to eastern Mashonaland by a new route, which would avoid the Matabele country. This plan was carried out in the summer of 1890, and, thanks to the rapidity with which the column moved and Selous’s intimate knowledge of the country, the British flag was, on the 11th of September, hoisted at a spot on the Makubusi river, where the town of Salisbury now stands, and the country taken possession of in the name of Queen Victoria. Disputes with the Portuguese ensued, and there were several frontier incidents which for a time embittered the relations between the two countries.

Meanwhile, north of the Zambezi, the Portuguese were making desperate but futile attempts to repair the neglect of centuries by hastily organized expeditions and the hoisting of flags. In 1888 an attempt to close the Zambezi to British vessels was frustrated by the firmness of Lord Salisbury. In a despatch to the British minister at Lisbon, dated the 25th of June 1888, Lord Salisbury, after brushing aside the Portuguese claims founded on doubtful discoveries three centuries old, stated the British case in a few sentences:—

In 1889 it became known to the British government that a considerable Portuguese expedition was being organized under the command of Major Serpa Pinto, for operating in the Zambezi region. In answer to inquiries addressed to the Portuguese government, the foreign minister stated that the object of the expedition was to visit the Portuguese settlements on the upper Zambezi. The British government was, even so late as 1889, averse from declaring a formal protectorate over the Nyasa region; but early in that year H. H. (afterwards Sir Harry) Johnston was sent out to Mozambique as British consul, with instructions to travel in the interior and report on the troubles that had arisen with the Arabs on Lake Nyasa and with the Portuguese. The discovery by D. J. Rankin in 1889 of a navigable mouth of the Zambezi–the Chinde–and the offer by Cecil Rhodes of a subsidy of £10,000 a year from the British South Africa Company, removed some of the objections to a protectorate entertained by the British government; but Johnston’s instructions were not to proclaim a protectorate unless circumstances compelled him to take that course. To his surprise Johnston learnt on his arrival at the Zambezi that Major Serpa Pinto’s expedition had been suddenly deflected to the north. Hurrying forward, Johnston overtook the Portuguese expedition and warned its leader that any attempt to establish political influence north of the Ruo river would compel him to take steps to protect British interests. On arrival at the Ruo, Major Serpa Pinto returned to Mozambique for instructions, and in his absence Lieutenant Coutinho crossed the river, attacked the Makololo chiefs and sought to obtain possession of the Shiré highlands by a coup de main. John Buchanan, the British vice-consul, lost no time in declaring the country under British protection, and his action was subsequently confirmed by Johnston on his return from a treaty-making expedition on Lake Nyasa. On the news of these events reaching Europe the British government addressed an ultimatum to Portugal, as the result of which Lieutenant Coutinho’s action was disavowed, and he was ordered to withdraw the Portuguese forces south of the Ruo. After prolonged negotiations, a convention was signed between Great Britain and Portugal on the 20th of August 1890, by which Great Britain obtained a broad belt of territory north of the Zambezi, stretching from Lake Nyasa on the east, the southern end of Tanganyika on the north, and the Kabompo tributary of the Zambezi on the west; while south of the Zambezi Portugal retained the right bank of the river from a point ten miles above Zumbo, and the western boundary of her territory south of the river was made to coincide roughly with the 33rd degree of east longitude. The publication of the convention aroused deep resentment in Portugal, and the government, unable to obtain its ratification by the chamber of deputies, resigned. In October the abandonment of the convention was accepted by the new Portuguese ministry as a fait accompli; but on the 14th of November the two governments signed an agreement for a modus vivendi, by which they engaged to recognize the territorial limits indicated in the convention of 20th August “in so far that from the date of the present agreement

to the termination thereof neither Power will make treaties, accept protectorates, nor exercise any act of sovereignty within the spheres of influence assigned to the other party by the said convention.” The breathing-space thus gained enabled feeling in Portugal to cool down, and on the 11th of June 1891 another treaty was signed, the ratifications being exchanged on the 3rd of July, As already stated, this is the main treaty defining the British and Portuguese spheres both south and north of the Zambezi. It contained many other provisions relating to trade and navigation, providing, inter alia, a maximum transit duty of 3% on imports and exports crossing Portuguese territories on the east coast to the British sphere, freedom of navigation of the