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Rh that, names or other means of identification are used routinely for billing and payment, whether payment apps, credit and debit cards, a bill sent by mail, or an invoice sent electronically. So long as the criteria for the broad predicate offenses are met, the Government’s reading creates an automatic 2-year sentence for generic overbilling that happens to use ubiquitous payment methods.

A far more sensible conclusion from the statutory structure is that §1028A(a)(1)’s enhancement is not indiscriminate, but targets situations where the means of identification itself plays a key role—one that warrants a 2-year mandatory minimum. This points once more to a targeted reading, where the means of identification is at the crux of the underlying criminality, not an ancillary feature of billing.

If more were needed, a final clue comes from the staggering breadth of the Government’s reading. This Court has “ ‘traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute.’ ” Marinello, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9) (quoting United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, 600 (1995)); see also Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S. 696, 703–704 (2005); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 27 (1931). This restraint arises “both out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress and out of concern that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understan[d] of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.” Marinello, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4) (internal quotation marks omitted). After all, “[c]rimes are supposed to be defined by the legislature, not by clever prosecutors riffing on equivocal language.” Spears, 729 F. 3d, at 758.