Page:Dubin v. United States.pdf/2

2 Section 1028A(a)(1) would thus apply automatically any time a name or other means of identification happens to be part of the payment or billing method used in the commission of a long list of predicate offenses. Dubin’s more targeted reading requires that the use of a means of identification have “a genuine nexus” to the predicate offense. When the underlying crime involves fraud or deceit, as many of §1028A’s predicates do, this entails using a means of identification specifically in a fraudulent or deceitful manner, not as a mere ancillary feature of a payment or billing method. A careful examination of §1028A(a)(1)’s text and structure points to a narrower reading. Pp. 4–5.

(1) Section 1028A is a focused, standalone provision, and its title—“Aggravated identity theft”—suggests that identity theft is at the core of §1028A(a)(1). A statute’s title has long been considered a “ ‘too[l] available for the resolution of a doubt’ about the meaning of a statute.” Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224, 234. Section 1028A’s title is especially valuable here because it does not summarize a list of “complicated and prolific” provisions, Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 528, and also “reinforces what the text’s nouns and verbs independently suggest,” Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 552 (, concurring in judgment). The Court has previously observed the contrast between §1028A’s targeted title and the broad title of neighboring provision §1028: “ ‘Fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents, authentication features, and information.’ ” Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U. S. 646, 655. That “Congress separated the [identity] fraud crime from the [identity] theft crime in” §1028A suggests that §1028A is focused on