Page:Documents from the Den of Espionage.djvu/30

 DEPARTMENT OF STATE,BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

To: The Secretary

From: INR - David E. Mark, Acting

This paper outlines our perspective on the fast-breaking events in Iran and on the steps the Shah must take very soon. We conclude that only drastic measures by the Shah hold any promise for staving off a descent into chaos.

The Shah's attempts to appease his opponents have failed. The opposition is coalescing and gaining momentum, while he loses initiative. The Shah himself has admitted in conversation with Ambassador Sullivan that immediate action is needed to quell the turmoil, but he seems unable to make up his mind what to do. Indeed, the process of consultations with Ambassadors Sullivan and Parsons betrays his inability to come to grips with the problems that face him. So far, the Shah cannot see beyond half-measures designed to defer hard decisions. If he has convinced himself that his ideas to date represent bold gestures or sweeping changes, then he is seriously out of touch with the current scene. His reversion to the moods of depression and vaccillation he displayed in the early 1950's makes it doubtful that he can move to salvage what remains of national unity, unless others intervene on his behalf.

In our judgment, the Shah has only two choices:


 * --He can stay on as a constitutional monarch with severely limited powers. This would mean allowing a coalition of moderate politicians to govern the country with the backing of moderate religious leaders; or

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