Page:Documents from the Den of Espionage.djvu/23



(Extract)

I.

1. This requires:


 * a. The will of Iran to remain independent and to defend itself.


 * b. The ability to discourage limited Soviet attacks on Iranian territory and, in the case of outright Soviet or Soviet-supported aggression, to delay it until Iran's allies can react.


 * c. Enhancement of internal loyalties, especially in areas of Iran which might become subject to foreign-inspired insurgency.


 * d. Ability to control such insurgency if it occurs.


 * e. The ability to discourage and, if necessary, to resist alone an attack by a neighboring country unsupported by the USSR.

2. This requires:


 * a. Continued Iranian understanding of the mutuality of Iranian interests and those of the Free World.


 * b. A mutually beneficial military relationship between Iran and the U.S.


 * c. A favorable U.S. image as effective guarantor of Iranian security and as a friendly power interested in Iranian independence and progress.


 * d. Specifically, such an image not only with the present governing elite but also with the likely successors to that elite.


 * e. Demonstration of our own devotion to the objective of making Iran progressively less dependent on foreign assistance.