Page:Documents from the Den of Espionage.djvu/16

 01 NOV

79 04 132

S E C R E T 3116132 OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 543215.

TO: STOKHOLM INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA SEPLOD

1. ACCORDING TO SDPLOD/1 HE WAS PLANNING TO DEPART TEHRAN FOR STOCKHOLM ON 25 OCTOBER. HE WAS GOINT TO PICK UP HIS WIFE IN STOCKHOLM THEN PROCEED TO SOLO TO PRESENT HIS CREDENTIALS. WHILE IN TEHRAN, SDPLOD/1 WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT DETERIORATING RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND ASKED US FOR ANY INFORMATION WHICH WE MAY HAVE WHICH BEARS ON THE SUBJECT OF IRAQI/IRANIAN RELATIONS. WOULD APPRECIATE COS CONTACT SDPLOD/1 AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND PASSING FOLLOWING REPORT TO SDPLOD/1, EMPHASIZING THAT REPORT FORWARDED BY ADLESICK IN REPLY TO CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY SDPLOD/1 IN TEHRAN.

2. TEXT OF REPORT AS FOLLOWS: "BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER, SENIOT MEMBERS OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD BECOME CONVINCED THAT IRANIAN POLICY WAS TO ACTIVELY PURSUE ITS CLAIM TO BERAYN ISLAND THE IRAQI VIEW WAS ARRIVED AT AFTER CAREFUL STUDY OF NUMEROUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS MADE BY IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS DETAILING THE IRANIAN CLAIM TO BAHRAYN.

"PRIOR TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IRAN WAS ACTIVELY PURSUING ITS CLAIN TO BAERAYN, IRAQI LEADER SADAM HUSAIN HAD THOUGHT THERE WAS SOME POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN, PARTICULARLY AFTER HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIM YAZDI IN HAVANA DURING THE COURSE OF NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, HAS SOME PROBLEM IN DETERMINING THE PROPER WAY TO DEAL WITH THE PGOI. SADAM FUSAYN HAD ORIGINALLY HOPED TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE PROME MINISTER BAZARGAN. AT THE MOMENT THE IRAQIES ARE UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE PGOI, AS THEY INCREASINGLY BELIEVE THAT THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT REPREST MUCH ANDD THE REAL POWER LIES IN THE IRANIAN RELIGIOUS ESTABLISEMENT WHICH IS HOSTILE TO IRAQ.

"DESPITE THE FAILURE TO PURSUE SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN THE