Page:Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization.pdf/211

 out core testimonial evidence, and overruling Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980)); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 651-652 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment applies to the States, and overruling the contrary rule of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), after considering and rejecting "the current validity of the factual grounds upon which Wolf was based").

Some cited overrulings involved both significant doctrinal developments and changed facts or understandings that had together undermined a basic premise of the prior decision. See Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U. S. __, __, __-__ (2018) (slip op., at 42, 47-49) (holding that requiring public-sector union dues from non-members violates the First Amendment, and overruling Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977), based on "both factual and legal" developments that had "eroded the decision's underpinnings and left it an outlier among our First Amendment cases" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644, 659-663 (2015) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of same-sex couples to marry in light of doctrinal developments, as well as fundamentally changed social understanding); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 572-578 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986), after finding anti-sodomy laws to be inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment in light of developments in the legal doctrine, as well as changed social understanding of sexuality); United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 101 (1978) (overruling United States v. Jenkins, 420 U. S. 358 (1975), three years after it was decided, because of developments in the Court's double jeopardy case law, and because intervening practice had shown that government appeals from midtrial dismissals requested by the defendant were practicable, desirable, and consistent with double jeopardy values); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197-199, 210, n. 23 (1976) (holding that sex-based classifications are subject to intermediate