Page:Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization.pdf/210

 455 (1942)); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 659-662 (1944) (recognizing all-white primaries are unconstitutional after reconsidering in light of "the unitary character of the electoral process" recognized in United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941), and overruling Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45 (1935)); United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 115-117 (1941) (recognizing Congress's Commerce Clause power to regulate employment conditions and explaining as "inescapable" the "conclusion that Hammer v. Dagenhart, [247 U. S. 251 (1918)]," and its contrary rule had "long since been" overtaken by precedent construing the Commerce Clause power more broadly); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78-80 (1938) (applying state substantive law in diversity actions in federal courts and overruling Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), because an intervening decision had "made clear" the "fallacy underlying the rule").

Additional cases the majority cites involved fundamental factual changes that had undermined the basic premise of the prior precedent. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010) (expanding First Amendment protections for campaign-related speech and citing technological changes that undermined the distinctions of the earlier regime and made workarounds easy, and overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652 (1990), and partially overruling McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U. S. 93 (2003)); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 62-65 (2004) (expounding on the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses and rejecting the prior framework, based on its practical failing to keep