Page:DoD USS Liberty Inquiry Press Release 28 Jun 1967.djvu/16

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a. wedge type formation with the center boat the lead point of the wedge. Esti» mated speed of the boats was about 27 to 30 knots. They appeared to be about 150 to 200 yards apart. It appeared that they were approaching the ship in a torpedo launch attitude, and since I did not have direct communication with gun control or the gun mounts, I told a man from the bridge, whose identity I do not recall, to proceed to mOunt 51 and take the boats under fire. The boats continued to approach the ship at high speed and on a constant bearing with decreasing range.

About this time I noticed that our Ensign had been shot away during the air attack and ordered David, signalman, to hoist a second Ensign from the yardarm. During the air attack, our normal Ensign was flying. Before the torpedo attack, a holiday size Ensign was hoisted.

I alerted the crew as best I could to stand by for torpedo attack from starboard. I did not have an accurate ship's position at this time, but I knew that to the left of the ship's course at that time {in shoal waters and by turning to the left I would be approaching land, closer than had been given me in directives which I held in that instant in time. I realized that if I attempted to turn to starboard, I would expose a larger target to the torpedo boats. I elected to maintain a heading of 283 at maximum speed.

When the boats reached an approximate range of 2. 000 yards, the center boat of the formation was signalling to us. Also, at this range, it appeared that they were flying an Israeli flag. This was later verified. It was not possible to read the signals from the center titrpedo boat because of the intermittent blocking of view by smoke and flames. At this time, I yelled to machine gun 51 to t‘eil him to hold fire. I realized that there was a possibility of the aircraft having been Israeli and the attack had been conducted in error. I wanted to hold fire to see if we could read the signal from the torpedo boat and perhaps avoid additional damage and personnel injuries- The man on machine gun 51 fired a short burst at the boar. s before he was able to understand what I was attempting to have him do. Instantly, on machine gun 51 opening fire machine gun 53 began firing at the center boat. From the starboard wing of the bridge, 03 level, I observed that the fire from machine gun 53 was extremely effective and blanketed the area and the center torpedo boat. It was not possible to get to mount 53 from the starw bard wing of the bridge. I sent Mr. Lucas around the port side of the bridge, around to the skylights, to See if he could tell Quintero, whom I believed to be the gunner on machine gun 53, to hold fire until We Were able to clarify the situation. He reported back in a few minutes in effect that he saw no one at mount 53.

At this time, they opened fire with their gun mounts and in a matter of seconds, one torpedo was noted crosmng astern of the ship at about 25 yards. The time that this torpedo crossed the stern is believed to be about 1426.53< About 1427, withOut advance warning, the ship sustained a torpedo hit starboard Rh