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Rh of mankind. The system is thus a selfish one; though only theoretically so, since its propounder would have held fast to the doctrine that the just is the only happy life, i.e. (according to the theory of this dialogue) the one which affords tο the agent himself the greatest excess of pleasure over pain. The standard of the Protagoras agrees with that of the historical Sokrates, who throughout the Memorabilia inculcates the ordinary duties of life on hedonistic grounds, and recommends

them by the ordinary hedonistic inducements, the good opinion and praise of fellow-citizens, reciprocity of good treatment, and the favor of benevolent deities. Even in the Leges, Plato affirms that people will never be persuaded to prefer Virtue unless convinced of its being the path of greatest pleasure, and that whether it is so or not (though he fully believes that it is), they must not only be taught to believe this, but no approach to a doubt of it must be tolerated within the country. The Sokrates of the Gorgias, however, dissents both from the Sokrates of the Protagoras and from the real Sokrates.

Good is, with him, no longer synonymous with Pleasurable, nor Evil with Painful. To constitute any-

thing a Good, it must be either pleasurable or beneficial (ὠᾳέλιμον), and Justice belongs to the category of Beneńcial; but beneficial to what end, is not explained,

except that the end certainly is not Pleasure. Justice is assimilated to the health of the soul, injustice to a disease: and since the health of the body is the greatest good, and disease its greatest evil, the same estimate is

extended by analogy to the mind.

There is no attempt, in the Gorgias, to define Justice. In the Republic, which has this definition for its express purpose, and