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 of a serious crime, quickly investigated this matter, and in very short order, determined the story to be false. In fact, Lisa herself admitted to having been with friends during the time in question.[8] Despite the speed in which the German authorities were able to reach a logical conclusion, the story had taken on a life of its own.

SUCCESSFUL ALIGNMENT WITH SOCIAL MEDIA TO ACHIEVE DISINFORMATION

The Lisa saga began taking shape with Russia’s state-sponsored Channel One which broadcasts into Germany in Russian. The story was then picked up by Russia Today (RT); RT Deutsch, and Sputnik. All three are well-known – overt – Russian government controlled media outlets. In fact, in 2017, RT and Sputnik registered with the U.S. Department of Justice under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) declaring their respective organizations as agents of a foreign power, to wit, Russia. This overt media activity was coupled with the covert actions of a Facebook group and anti-refugee website called Ayslterror, which was later determined to have links to Russia.[9] The actions of this group spurred various social media and rightwing groups to widely distribute the information on the internet, to include demonstrations which were organized via Facebook involving representatives of the German-Russian minority (Deutschlandrussen) as well as neo-Nazi groups.[10] This disinformation campaign focused on exploiting the existing divide among Germans as it related to the Arab-migrant issues and some speculate it was orchestrated and directed in response to Germany’s leading role in the Ukraine crisis and Chancellor Merkel’s subsequent stance on sanctions against Russia.

Whether it is the use of intelligence operatives in the field or intelligence operatives behind the keyboard, Russia has fully embraced a strategy of information warfare, one designed to achieve long-standing intelligence objectives in support of their overall geopolitical agenda. The Lisa case is one of a handful of cases that can be viewed as evidence that the Kremlin is engaged in a structured approach to leverage new age technologies.[11][12][13] A thoughtful analysis of the methodologies employed reveals an organized model that serves as a framework for conducting foreign influence operations in the Information Age, and incorporates several logical steps to ensure maximum impact.

The influence campaign begins by identifying existing socially and politically divisive issues followed by the development of messaging themes to amplify these divisions along existing fault lines. The adversary then begins to establish the technical infrastructure and networks of influence, which will ultimately be used to publish and perpetuate the campaign. Simultaneously, affirmative efforts are undertaken to obtain and produce material that will yield the desired objective. Once the sought after information is obtained, through hacking, forgery, or “creative” content such as articles, blogs, or specifically designed news stories presenting false information, it is then published to the targeted audiences for public consumption. 24 THE CYBER DEFENSE REVIEW