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 inevitable anyhow. The whole of our diplomatic force was exhausted by the attempt to sever the European from the Serbian questions. We were prepared to sign an agreement with Russia with reference to the preservation of our interests. We were prepared, for the sake of Russia, to make favourable conditions of peace to Serbia, only we were determined to be armed while we demanded a reckoning from her. Tisza's suggestion, not to make territorial conquests at the expense of Serbia, was accepted unanimously by the Cabinet Ministers in the hope that the World War might thus be avoided.

When we recognized clearly that this object was unattainable, and that the Serbian war would cause a European conflagration, our policy changed its course. Russia mobilized her army against Austria-Hungary on July 29. We realized fully that France would support Russia's attitude. Grey gave Bethmann-Hollweg to understand quite clearly that he could not count on British neutrality, and that it was possible that England would decide rapidly on intervention.

The Kaiser, who was prepared to accept the Serbian reply as a basis of negotiations, was alarmed by the danger of European war, and advised acceptance urgently. Beihmann-Hollweg wrote an almost threatening note to Berchtold, and advised him to accept Grey's suggestion according to which we were to arrest the progress of our troops, retain Belgrade as a hostage, and accept the intervention of the Great Powers between us and Russia.