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 anxious to make use of her position in order to pursue her old Balkan policy, we made arrangements to increase our activities there. While Russia was preoccupied in the Far East, our Minister for Foreign Affairs pursued a passive policy. Just at the time that Russia turned her attention once more to the Balkans, we had a Minister for Foreign Affairs who pursued the most self-conscious policy of aggression and who was determined to increase our prestige in the East and to multiply our economic activities. I refer to Freiherr von Aehrenthal. The first step of this energetic and ambitious statesman was to secure the railway communication with Salonika. This action alone caused considerable jealousy in Petrograd, although it was entirely justified and not aggressive in any way.

The tension became relaxed, because the policy of Iswolski had not yet taken an antagonistic direction. His policy required certain results in the East, but if they could be achieved in harmony with Russia, so much the better. Aehrenthal and Iswolski met in 1908 in Buchlau, and it seemed as if there was a possibility of reaching an agreement. In exchange for a suitable solution of the question of the Straits, Russia was inclined to support the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The discussion, however, did not define the manner of the solution nor its date. Aehrenthal, of course, proceeded to publish the annexation, and Iswolski felt that he had been betrayed because the question of the Straits had not been settled. The result was an acute diplomatic battle, in the course of which