Page:Diplomacy and the War (Andrassy 1921).djvu/321

 wise inevitable bloodshed, and prevent furthermore the destruction of property and values whose consequences they would have to bear as well as ourselves. However, I strove in vain once more. Nevertheless, it would have been easy to frustrate the constitution of a Soviet Government. A small military force would have been sufficient to frighten the Communist leaders. The French troops in Southern Hungary did not cost the Entente a penny less than they would have done in Budapest. The danger of infection was greater round about the origin of the revolution in consequence of their inaction, than the danger for the troops of the Entente would have been on the ruins of the revolution itself, on account of the fact that their military duties would have employed them. If we had been satisfied at that time that the nation would obtain bearable conditions of peace, almost the whole of Hungary would have been solidly behind the Entente. Instead of this, the Entente only assisted in making the Soviet régime more secure. For the first time they sent a leading statesman to Budapest. The South African politician, Smuts, recognized at once that it was impossible to come to an agreement with Kun and his followers, because Kun understood by "peace" the freedom to continue his revolutionary propaganda. Even then it would have been easy to deduce the consequences of experience and to occupy Budapest.

The Entente, however, did not move a finger. The Soviet Republic became established, and we were faced by new tortures in the future.