Page:Diplomacy and the War (Andrassy 1921).djvu/266

 our behalf. It was now no longer a question of preparing for war, but a question of smoothing the path to peace. Our situation was totally different from the one in November, 1917, in France, when Clemenceau took over control. In our case victory was impossible, but in France it was only a question of the defeat of a momentary depression.

The second possible solution was the formation of a Cabinet of Karolyi, with the power to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, or to create a majority by means of force. In many of our circles this was regarded from the point of view of foreign policy as the most advantageous solution; I had, however, returned from Switzerland with the impression that Karolyi did not enjoy as much confidence from the Entente as his supporters boasted. His socialist, pacifist and revolutionary propaganda did not meet with the approval of those who had fought a bitter battle with the Socialists and the Pacifists at home, and who treated Karolyi's type of politician with the utmost severity. The very fact that it was possible for Karoyli to gain power might have endangered our southern and eastern frontiers, which were still defended by the German Army. It was only natural that in such circumstances the Germans would have made their way through Hungary as a result of the conviction that Karolyi would turn against them, and something might happen which unfortunately, and to the great disgrace of the Hungarian name, actually did happen with that noble general, General Mackensen, who had defended our