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 conducted an offensive twice over, without having sufficient power to do it, and at a time when we needed every single soldier in a more important theatre of war. On the first occasion we shed more blood than was necessary without achieving a permanent success, and we excited the jealousy of the Italians. The second offensive led to a catastrophe which was perhaps the saddest in the whole of the war. When Potiorek had the victory apparently already in his hands, he risked everything. He divided his army into two parts, sent one portion towards the north in order to deliver the keys of Belgrade into the hands of the highest War Lord for the glorification of the Emperor's Jubilee (2nd December, 1914); whereas he committed the other portion, consisting of worn-out troops, who were far distant from their reserves and from munitions, to a battle which he lost completely. It was a tragic and classic example of lip-service and the menial spirit of the courtier. By this procedure small Serbia gained an enormous victory over her powerful neighbour.

The result was that in Galicia and in Serbia we lost the flower of our army without achieving a corresponding result. The defeat could be made good, but the dead could not be raised to life again. The good name of the army, moreover, suffered so severely that, notwithstanding many proofs of courage, many brilliant ideas and many fair victories, the blemish could never be removed completely. Our self-assurance, which was never too firmly rooted in Austria, began to waver.