Page:Diplomacy and the War (Andrassy 1921).djvu/202

 leadership and the favour of fortune could have secured a victory for us. I do not wish to enter the labyrinth of military questions, but I only want to point to some mistakes which were made on our side.

From the very beginning I was convinced that we ought to concentrate our forces against Russia, and that, unless the momentary position forced us to adopt different methods of procedure in other theatres of war, we ought to attack our strongest enemy on the continent until he collapsed completely.

Apart from the political reasons which I have given earlier on, I came to this conclusion in view of the strategic position of Poland. Our Eastern frontiers were suitable to an offensive and unfavourable to the defensive plan of campaign. The situation was unfavourable for defence because the kingdom of Poland is in such a central position that the Russian Army can from there threaten Berlin, Budapest and Vienna in a similar manner, and could force us to hold large forces in readiness in order to defend our capital. By exploiting the advantages of the internal lines of communication the Russian Army could defeat our forces separately. As soon as we confined ourselves to the defensive, we had to gather together enormous forces, and even they had to be exposed to the danger of being vanquished separately. For an attack, however, the strategic position was very favourable. The Russian Army marched into Poland in such a state of confusion that the army could almost be throttled, provided we attacked the army from both ends with energy. More-