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 exploitation of this opportunity was made more difficult by the mistakes which we had committed. We paid a heavy price for the fact that, especially at that time, we were not united. The famous resolution adopted in the German Reichstag was the product of an atmosphere of panic, and created an impression of increasing weakness. At the same time, however, the German Government and the highest command made an imperialistic policy felt which was in opposition to this resolution. In consequence of the confusion of this situation, it was difficult to have faith in our honesty. We could neither command respect nor inspire confidence. The chief mistake, however, was made at the time of the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, during which the means of the negotiations were mistaken as well as their aims.

The means of negotiation were mistaken because they lent weight to Bolshevism, because it was regarded as a revolutionary act that the leading Ministers of two Emperors sat down at the same table and negotiated for weeks with bourgeois representatives of any sort of authority of the enemy. Trotzki boasted truly that the strikes in Berlin, Vienna and Budapest were the direct echo of the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk. While negotiations were proceeding, the Bolshevists attempted, by means of pamphlets, to make the soldiers of the German Army and of our own unfit for battle, and to cause a revolution behind our front line. All this could have been foreseen in advance. It was impossible to come to an agreement with the Bolshevists. One should