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 the conquest by mighty parties was abhorred in principle by the multitude, and since complete victory could hardly be hoped for when seriously considered, the unity of our inner front line could only be achieved by the proclamation of moderation, the defensive objects, and the peace by agreement. There was nothing that endangered the determination to go to war in a higher degree than the policy which placed the peace programme of the military party in the foreground and the pretence which asserted that the war had to be continued in accordance with the demands of the General Staff and the big industries. From the point of view of concluding peace and continuing the war, we would have been in the best position if it had been possible to exploit theoretical success by elastic and modest war aims, which at the same time permitted it to be recognized that we were ready to make peace as soon as our previous position could be guaranteed.

I considered the situation most favourable for peace after the success at Gorlice, after we had beaten the Russians, after the Italians could not achieve any visible success, and after the Serbians had been conquered. This was at the end of the year 1915. I also considered the moment after the Russian Revolution as favourable, as our Eastern front gradually became freer, and when the Western Powers were exposed to the danger that those victorious armies which had greater achievements to their credit than any army in the whole course of history would be turned with the whole of their power against them (1917). Unfortunately, however, the