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 especially mistaken because it was entirely superfluous. The young King wanted peace and only peace, and everybody knew it. Public opinion also was in favour of peace. A military party of any importance existed neither in Vienna nor in Budapest. It would have been impossible to continue the war as soon as public opinion had obtained any knowledge of the possibility of concluding peace. Even the leaders of the army advised peace for a long time.

The difficulties which were placed in the way by Germany should not have been surmounted by pacifist propaganda but by an energetic, secret action on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. On final analysis, I would not have been held back even by the threat of a separate peace, only I would have exerted my utmost power to avoid public quarrels, because this could only increase the consciousness of victory in the circles of the Entente.

As a matter of fact, the opposite generally occurred. The opposition between Vienna and Berlin became public, and we were not in a position to exert a moderating influence in Berlin because they knew there very well that it was possible to persuade us against our own inclinations. Would the Entente not have used less violent language, and would the friends of peace in London and Paris not have found a more fruitful soil for their aspirations, if we had co-operated more and if the war agitators of the enemy had not always been in a position to point to the decisive political power of German militarism?