Page:Diplomacy and the War (Andrassy 1921).djvu/170

 or momentary alliances. Anyone who disregards this changes the fortune of to-day into the misfortune of to-morrow.

Moderation in case of victory was the only right policy for us. The relation of power was unfavourable from our point of view. If we had exploited the possible victory completely, we would only have exposed ourselves to the feelings of revenge of the superior powers. There was no necessity to develop the position of our power; our only aim was to secure those factors which existed already, and our conditions had to be made accordingly.

The most natural and the most justified demand was the removal of the main cause of the war. The Serbian danger had to be abolished. And we would have been able to achieve this if we had ceded Macedonia to Bulgaria, and if we had contented ourselves with adjustment of our strategic frontiers which assured the military domination of the valley of the Danube and the Bay of Cattaro. The remaining portions of Serbia and Montenegro might have developed into a federal state capable of existence together with Scutari under King Nicholas, provided they obtained a port and an army which could safeguard internal order and by making a tariff union with ourselves.

Our headquarters and certain political circles in Austria, however, demanded the conquest of the Serbian and Montenegrian people in toto. I was attacked strongly in the press by Tesrhen on account of my moderate attitude. Leading military personalities took