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 afraid, however, that a previous agreement would endanger the possibility of a peace by agreement. Quite on the contrary, I counted upon the fact that a solution between Germany and us would make the conclusion of peace more easy and would render other concessions superfluous.

At one time there was a decided determination in Germany to create a Central Europe. On our side there was no decided opposition to this plan, but I believe that there was also no definite policy in favour of it. As far as I know, the military command did not want to hear anything of a military convention, but there were strong supporters among the German Austrians and the Hungarian agriculturists for an economic approach to Germany. This policy was also included in the programme of the Cabinet of Wekerle, but the idea met with strong opposition from a certain section of industry and from the Czech and South Slavonic parties and from all those elements of the Monarchy which entertained antagonistic feelings towards Germany. The suitable moment was allowed to slip by. It became more and more difficult to achieve an advantageous result, until I finally considered the pursuance of this policy a mistake in view of the diminished prospects of victory. My only thought was how to secure peace—an object which would only have been endangered by continued negotiations with Germany.

With regard to our relations with Germany, I only wish to emphasize that during the war I considered a common, homogeneous military command as absolutely