Page:Diplomacy and the War (Andrassy 1921).djvu/132

 conditions in case the Entente had interfered, would have removed the danger of a world war far more easily than the method which was actually adopted.

But in my opinion our position was not quite hopeless even then. The control of our internal line of communications, Russia's organic weakness, the incomplete development of the British Army, our greater military rapidity and our more homogeneous and superior leadership, all combined to make it possible that we would be able to contest the fight successfully in spite of the numerical superiority of our enemies and in spite of British supremacy at sea. It was quite certain, however, that we had a very difficult fight before us, and that we should have prevented the entry of new enemies into the war even at the cost of the heaviest sacrifices. Unfortunately, however, we failed to achieve this end.

Italy was the first state with whose entry into the war we had to reckon. When Italy did not support us at the outbreak of war, it was quite clear to me that our main efforts would have to aim at preventing Italy's entry into the war against us. The danger was already apparent through her motives for neutrality. In explaining her motives she described our policy as aggressive. As the quick military successes on which we had counted with certainty did not occur, I felt that the neutrality of Italy could only be secured by giving her territorial concessions. Although it was a painful decision to hand over territories which are one's legal right for merely political reasons without getting