Page:Diplomacy and the Study of International Relations (1919).djvu/215

 peoples of Europe, and there is no appreciable gain to their sovereigns. As an association of States the system is imperfect. It is necessary to erect in its stead a solid confederation that shall last. That cannot be done unless all its members are brought into a state of mutual dependence, so that no one of them shall be in a position to resist all the rest, and any combination formed for particular and selfish ends, inimical to the interests of the confederation, shall have obstacles opposed to it fully adequate to prevent these ends from being attained. There are several clear requisites. The confederation must include all the Powers of Europe; at least, no Power that is not one of the weakest shall decline to be a member. There must be a common tribunal with power to establish general laws and regulations binding on all the members. It must have a coercive power capable both of compelling and restraining the action of each in conformity with the decisions that have been taken in common. It must have power capable of preventing any member from seceding from the confederation at its own whim and impulse, as soon as it imagines that its own particular interest is contrary to the general interest. Without the recognition of this general interest no such confederation can be formed; without it none that may incautiously be formed can endure. There are two prerequisites: sufficient reason to see what is useful, and sufficient courage to do what is essential to the welfare and happiness of society.

The 'Germanic body' was far spent in decay and was preparing its self-destruction even while Rousseau was writing. The Peace of Westphalia might well seem to many to have been traitorously treated, and with it the whole of 'the system of Europe' undermined, when Austria and France