Page:Diplomacy and the Study of International Relations (1919).djvu/203

 One of the articles of Saint-Pierre’s Project stipulated that if any of the allied Powers should refuse to give effect to the judgements of the grand alliance, or should negotiate treaties in contravention of these judgements, the alliance should oppose the force of arms to the offending Power until it was brought to obedience. The succeeding article of confederation declared that the general assembly of plenipotentiaries of this European alliance should have power to enact by a plurality of votes all laws necessary and proper to give effect to the objects of the alliance; but no alteration in the fundamental articles was to be made without the unanimous consent of the allies.

These two articles form the link in the Projects of Perpetual Peace of Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Kant, and Bentham.

How were the rights of the Federation to be extended and secured without impairing those of sovereignty? How is each State to be left master in its own house, and yet fulfil the duty which it owes to the Federation? That, as Rousseau clearly saw, was the vital problem, and to no political thinker could it be more real and critical than to the interpreter and champion of the general will in politics and the upholder of the rights of small States and of the saving function of Federation in their behalf.

We may express the problem in the terms of the problem of the Social Contract: 'Trouver une forme d'association qui défende et protège de toute la force commune la personne et les biens de chaque associé, et par laquelle chacun, s'unissant à tous, n'obéisse pourtant qu'à lui-même, et reste aussi libre qu'auparavant.'

'En effet, chaque individu peut, comme homme, avoir une volonté particulière contraire ou dissemblable à la volonté générale qu'il a comme citoyen; son intérêt particulier peut