Page:Dictionary of National Biography volume 61.djvu/352

 ‘it was over with the king of Prussia.’ But by the 16th he had learnt that his scheme found no favour at Vienna, and had been brought to send Frederick the strongest assurances of support, and to suggest to Cumberland that he should march up the Elbe to Magdeburg, to co-operate with the Prussians, or in some other way give occupation to part of the French army (Addit. MSS. 32872 fol. 426, 516, 32873 fols. 1, 111, 299, 539, 541, 32874 fols. 76, 81).

It was too late. On 8 Sept. the convention of Kloster-Zeven had been signed. The duke had hoped to be able to maintain himself at Stade with the support of British ships in the Elbe. But his communication with these was cut off; the French army, now under Richelieu, had been raised to more than three times his own numbers, and he might soon be forced to surrender. The king of Denmark, at the request of George II, had sent Count Lynar to negotiate between the two commanders, and the count had brought about an arrangement, of which he was so proud that he could ascribe it to nothing short of divine inspiration. Hostilities were to cease, and the army of observation was to be broken up. The Hanoverian troops, excepting the garrison of Stade, were to cross the Elbe; and the other troops were to be sent home to their own states, but not to lay down their arms.

Napoleon has blamed this convention as far too favourable to the duke's army (Commentaires, vi. 356). The French government declined to ratify it as it stood, and Richelieu overstepped its terms by trying to disarm the Hessian troops. But it was a great blow to Frederick, who relieved himself characteristically by mocking verses (Œuvres, xiv. 165). In England it met with the strongest condemnation, and from no one more loudly than from the king, who threw the whole blame of it upon his son. He assured his English ministers that it was directly contrary to his orders, that his honour and his interest were sacrificed by it, and that if any other man in the world had done it, he should conclude that he had been bought by France. He let them notify his disapprobation to the duke, and his surprise that it should have been carried into execution without waiting for his ratification. Its execution had in fact been suspended by the duke owing to Richelieu's action. Pitt, while he freely allowed that the duke had full powers to do what he had done, was for setting the convention aside, and falling upon the French at once; and on 5 Oct. the king sent orders to his Hanoverian ministers to take that course on some pretext or other, unless the risk of reprisals was too great (Addit. MS. 32874, fols. 148, 165, 413, 448).

By this time the duke had left the army for England. He had not shown much talent or vigour in the campaign. Though a good soldier, he had never had the intuition of a general, nor perhaps the calmness. George II was told that ‘his head turned’ both at Hastenbeck and at Laeffelt. Always stout, he had now become corpulent and had lost his activity. He was in bad health, and the old wound in his leg gave him trouble. But it must also be remembered that he was overmatched in numbers, his troops had no cohesion, and his hands were tied by his instructions. As regards the convention, he justly maintained: ‘I have acted, as it appeared to me, most agreeable to his majesty's orders, and for the good of that army and country that his majesty had entrusted to my care’ (ib. 32874, fol. 385).

He reached London on 11 Oct. The king, in an interview of only four minutes, told him ‘that he had ruined his country and his army, and had spoiled everything, and had hurt, or lost, his own reputation.’ The duke gave the king a written ‘justification’ (of which there is a copy in the Cumberland Papers), but the king handed it over to his Hanoverian minister, Münchhausen. At cards that evening he said openly, when the duke came into the room: ‘Here is my son who has ruined me and disgraced himself’ (, George II, ii. 249). That night the duke asked permission, through Lady Yarmouth, to resign his military appointments. The king sent word by the Duke of Devonshire that he wished him not to give up his regiment, but the duke replied ‘that his honour would not permit him to stay in service at present.’ His resignation took effect from 15 Oct. In order that it might be final, Pitt pressed the appointment of a successor. The king at first demurred, saying that ‘if he had a mind to be reconciled to his son, nobody had anything to do with it;’ but he soon consented, and Ligonier was made commander-in-chief and colonel of the 1st guards before the end of the month (Addit. MS. 32875, fols. 56, 120, 198; Bedford Corresp. ii. 275).

Wolfe's comment at the time was: ‘The duke's resignation may be reckoned an addition to our misfortunes; he acted a right part, but the country will suffer by it.’ Wolfe had sometimes complained that the duke's notions were narrow, not going beyond perfection of battalion drill; but he thought well of his abilities, and spoke of him in 1755 as ‘for ever doing