Page:Dictionary of National Biography volume 60.djvu/196

 Wellesley Brussels at 3 P.m., and he sent off orders for his troops to be in readiness to move. At 10 .—when reports from Mons had satisfied him that the attack was not a feint—-he directed them on Nivelles and Quatre Bras (Desp. 15 June, and, p. 230). He then went to the Duchess of Richmond's ball to allay anxiety (see, The Waterloo Ball, 1897; this famous entertainment was held, not in the Hotel de Ville, as Byron's well-known lines would imply, but in a coach-maker's depot in the Rue de la Blanchisserie). A brigade of Perponcher's Dutch division was engaged that evening near Quatre Bras, but held its ground, and was reinforced by the other brigade before morning.

Wellington reached Quatre Bras about 10. on the 16th, and, seeing little of the enemy rode over to Brye, where he met Blücher at 1. Three Prussian corps, eighty-two thousand men, were drawn up behind the Ligny brook, in a position which made Wellington sure they would be 'damnably mauled' (, p. 109). He did not hide his opinion, but he promised that he would bring his troops to their support if he were not attacked himself. He had sent a note to Bliicher at 10.30 ., stating generally the situation of his troops at that time. The statements were inexact, for his staff were over sanguine in their calculations; but there is nothing to show that they influenced Blücher's decision to accept battle, or led him to count on assistance, much less that they were deliberately misleading, as Dr. Hans Delbriick has alleged (, p. 257;, p. 125).

On his return to Quatre Bras Wellington found that the troops there had been attacked by Ney, with about eighteen thousand men, at 2. They were being overpowered when Picton's division arrived, followed by the Brunswick and Nassau troops. In spite of brilliant charges by the French cavalry, in one of which Wellington narrowly escaped capture, Quatre Bras was held, and by evening Ney was outnumbered and forced back. D'Erlon's corps, which had been allotted to him, was afterwards diverted towards Ligny, and then, on his urgent summons, marched back to join him. It took no part in either action, but nevertheless Wellington could claim that he had relieved his ally of one-third of the French army. He lost nearly five thousand men.

Next morning he learnt that the Prussians had been beaten and had retreated on Wavre, and he fell back to the position in front of Waterloo which he had caused to be surveyed in 1814. Except for a cavalry skirmish, his retreat was unmolested; but it was made under heavy rain, which lasted all night. He had sent word to Blücher that he would hold his position if he could count upon the support of one or two Prussian corps, and in the night of the 17th he received a reply promising two corps and perhaps more. He is said to have mentioned long afterwards that he himself rode over to Wavre that night and saw Blücher (, p. 533). The Prussian commander was over seventy, and had been badly bruised at Ligny, but his energy was unabated; he wrote next morning that, ill as he was, he should put himself at the head of his troops, to attack the right wing of the enemy as soon as Napoleon should attempt anything against the duke. This letter was to Müffling, the Prussian representative at the English headquarters; and Gneisenau, the chief of the start' (who had previously warned Müffling that Wellington surpassed Indian nabobs in duplicity), added a postscript begging him to find out whether Wellington really meant to fight, as his retreat would place the Prussian army in the greatest danger (, pp. 187-9;, p. 212).

Wellington believed that only one corps instead of two had been detached under Grouchy to follow the Prussians, and that he had all the rest of the French army before him (Desp. 19 June); but he was still so anxious lest his right should be turned that he kept nearly fifteen thousand men, including one British brigade of two thousand four hundred men, at Hal and Tubize, eight miles to the west. He reckoned on early help from the Prussians to enable him to hold his ground, and he had no reason to suppose that Napoleon was unaware of their position or would disregard it. He always afterwards maintained that Napoleon should have turned his right instead of taking the bull by the horns (, p. 539;, i. 39). Reille, from large experience in Spain, warned the emperor that English troops in a good position were 'inexpugnable' by front attack, and advised him to manœuvre; but Napoleon was incredulous (, Mélanges, p. 273). His only fear was that Wellington would retire, and it was with equal satisfaction that the two commanders saw on the morning of Sunday, 18 June, that the issue was to be settled on that ground. Wellington would not allow the front of his position to be intrenched lest he should deter Napoleon from direct attack, and the latter satisfied himself that there were no intrenchments before he issued his orders (, i. 384;, p. 247).