Page:Dictionary of National Biography volume 60.djvu/195

 Wellesley and the Sword of Sweden were conferred on him.

On 5 July Wellington was apjpinted ambassador at Paris—a strange choice. On his way there he examined the defences of the Netherlands; he recommended the restoration of the barrier fortresses, and opposed the destruction of the works at Antwerp which the British government contemplated (Desp. 22 Sept.) Among the field positions which he indicated in his report was that of Waterloo, and a special survey was made of it. He arrived at Paris on 22 Aug., where the house of Princess Borghese, still the British embassy, had been bought for him. His chief business as ambassador was to negotiate for the suppression of the slave trade, which was then being urged in England 'with all the earnestness, not to say violence, with which we are accustomed to urge such objects, without consideration for the prejudices and feelings of others' (Desp. 13 Oct.)

Some of the French marshals showed much irritation at his appointment, and, as the general discontent in Paris increased, the British government became alarmed for him. They proposed, therefore, to send him to North America, to replace Sir George Prevost (1767-1817) [q.v.], who had failed at Plattsburg. He replied, 'You cannot at this moment allow me to quit Europe,' and added that to withdraw him from Paris in a hurry would do harm, 'although I entertain a strong opinion that I must not be lost' (Suppl. Desp. 7 Nov.) It was then arranged that as Castlereagh must return to England for the session, Wellington should take his place at Vienna. This he did on 15 Feb. 1815. The main business of the congress was over; but his presence there and his absence from Paris were alike opportune when Napoleon returned. The news that he had left Elba reached Vienna on 7 March. Wellington at first thought his enterprise would fail, but was none the less for prompt and vigorous measures in support of Louis XVIII. On the 13th he signed the declaration of the powers, that Napoleon had 'placed himself outside civil and social relations, and handed himself over to public justice, as the enemy and disturber of the peace of the world,' and on the 25th he signed a treaty, based upon that of Chaumont (1 March 1814), for the combined action of the four great powers, each contributing 150,000 men (Desp. 14 and 27 March). The British government ratified the treaty, though it had not thought at first of going so far.

After signing it, Wellington set out for Brussels, and on his arrival there, on 4 April, received his commission (dated 28 March) as commander of the British and Hanoverian forces on the continent. He at once concerted measures with the Prussians at Aix la Chapelle for the security of Brussels, and he sent to Vienna a plan for the invasion of France which he hoped to see taken in hand at the beginning of May (Desp. 10 and 13 April). But it soon became clear that the Austrians and Russians would not be ready till July. In May the command of the Netherland troops was given to him, with the rank of field-marshal. By the middle of June his army had grown to 106,000 men, of which one-third were British, the rest being Dutch-Belgians or Germans. Most of the troops were raw and many half-hearted. His 'Spanish infantry,' as he called the regiments which had served in the Peninsula, had been sent for the most part to America. He organised the infantry in three corps: two were under the Prince of Orange and Lord Hill; the third, or reserve, he kept in his own hands. To each corps two British divisions were assigned, and each of these divisions included a Hanoverian brigade, except the guards. Instead of being left free to choose his own staff, he found himself 'overloaded with people I have never seen before' (Suppl. Desp. 4 May; Desp. 8 May and 25 June).

The Prussian army under Blücher, 117,000 strong, was echeloned on the Sambre and Meuse, from Charleroi to Liège. Its base was Cologne, while the British base was Antwerp, so that the lines of communication diverged. At a conference on 3 May at Tirlemont, Blücher and Wellington seem to have arranged that, in case Napoleon should aim at separating the two armies by an advance through Charleroi, they should concentrate near Ligny and Gosselies respectively (, p. 232). Wellington thought it more likely that Napoleon would try to turn his right, to cut his communication with England and Holland, and get possession of Ghent and Brussels. For this reason the cantonments of his first and second corps were spread over forty miles, to the west of the Charleroi-Brussels road, while the reserve was kept at Brussels (Suppl. Desp. x. 513-31, reply to Clausewitz written in 1842). But, in spite of rumours, he did not expect an immediate attack, and wrote, 'I think we are now too strong for him' (Desp. 13 June).

Napoleon had assembled on the frontier an army of 128,000 men, excellent troops, though hastily organised. He joined it on 14 June, and next morning, at daybreak, attacked the Prussian outposts at Thuin, near Charleroi. The news reached Wellington at