Page:Dictionary of National Biography volume 60.djvu/185

 Wellesley He remained convinced that the Bonaparte system was hollow and must collapse (Desp. 4 April 1810). In October he had carefully examined the country near Lisbon, and had started the works afterwards known as the lines of Torres Vedras (Desp. 20 Oct.; Suppl. Desp, 15 Oct., &c.) In reply to the anxious inquiries of the government, he assured them that the French armies would need to be very largely reinforced to subjugate Spain, and until that was done an army of thirty thousand British and forty-five thousand Portuguese, aided by militia, would be able to hold Portugal. If it came to the worst, the British could embark. 'I may fail, I shall be most confoundedly abused, and in the end I may lose the little character I have gained; but I should not act fairly by the government if I did not tell them my real opinion, which is, that they will betray the honour and interests of the country if they do not continue their efforts in the Peninsula' (Desp. 14 and 28 Nov.) He would not ask for more men, being sure he should not get them, and it would only give the ministers an excuse for withdrawing the army (ib. 14 Jan. 1810).

In the middle of January 1810 the French invaded Andalusia, and met with little resistance. Joseph entered Seville on 1 Feb., and on the 4th Victor invested Cadiz. The aid of British troops, hitherto declined, was now asked for by the Spanish regency, which had replaced the central junta. Wellington sent four regiments, and in a few months the force was increased to a division of 8,500 men under General Thomas Graham [q. v.] The French success increased the anxiety in England, and Liverpool wrote to Wellington that he would be more readily excused for bringing the army away too soon than for staying too long, adding, 'I could not recommend any attempt at what may be called desperate resistance' (Suppl. Desp. 13 March). Wellington was ready to accept the responsibility thus thrown on him, if only the government would trust him and leave him to exercise his own judgment; but if they were going to take other people's opinions instead of his, let them send him detailed instructions, and he would carry them out (Desp. 2 April).

Napoleon changed his mind about going to Spain himself, but he sent 150,000 men there, or to the frontier, in the first half of 1810. He wrote: 'The English alone are to be feared in Spain; the rest are mere artisans, who can never keep the field' (31 Jan.) To drive 'the hideous leopard' into the sea, an army of Portugal was formed on 17 April, consisting of the 2nd corps (Reynier), the 6th (Ney), and the 8th (Junot), and numbering eighty thousand men. Massena was appointed to the command of it, and 30,000 men in the northern provinces of Spain were also placed under his orders. He was to spend the summer in taking frontier fortresses, and not enter Portugal till after the harvest.

To oppose this powerful army, Wellington had only about fifty thousand regular troops, half of which were Portugese, and he was very weak in cavalry. His object was 'to make the French move in masses, and to gain time; time to secure the harvest and complete the lines; time to discipline the regulars, to effect the arming and organisation of the ordenança, and to consolidate a moral ascendancy over the nation' (, ii. 396). He meant to lay waste the country as he fell back, to starve the enemy if they kept together, and beat them if they scattered (cf. Desp. 5 July 1811).

When Masséna joined his army on 27 June, the 6th and 8th corps were besieging Ciudad Rodrigo; the 2nd corps was at Merida, and Hill with twelve thousand men was at Portalegre, south of the Tagus, to watch it. Wellington, whose headquarters were at Almeida, was pressed both by Spaniards and Portuguese to raise the siege, and was taunted by the French with his inactivity; but he would not risk a battle in open country with such odds against him. Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered on 11 July, Almeida on 27 Aug. Wellington had fallen back as the French advanced, and the sharp action on the Coa fought by Robert Craufurd [q. v.] on 24 July was against his orders. In the middle of July Reynier had crossed the Tagus near Alcantara, and Hill had made a parallel movement, crossing at Villa Velha, and taken a position near Castel Branco. Behind him, on the Zezere, there was a reserve corps of ten thousand men, under Leith; for Wellington was uncertain as to the line of invasion, and the Serra de Estrella was an obstacle to prompt concentration. On 4 Aug. he issued a proclamation to the Portuguese, warning them that they must remove themselves and their property on the French approach.

On 16 Sept. Masséna assembled his three corps west of Almeida. He had decided to march by the right bank of the Mondego, and hoped to reach Coimbra before Wellington could be joined by Hill. But he had chosen the worst road in Portugal; his march was harassed, Leith and Hill joined Wellington on the 21st, and the allied army was