Page:Dictionary of National Biography volume 60.djvu/184

 Wellesley bore the brunt of these attacks, which were vigorous and obstinate, and were directed against both front and flank. There was a critical moment, when the English guards, following up too eagerly some troops they had repulsed, were met by the French reserves and driven back in confusion. But Wellesley, foreseeing what happened, had brought the 48th regiment from the left, and its steady fire gave the centre time to reform. At length the French retired, leaving seventeen guns on the field and having lost over seven thousand men. The loss of the British was 5,400 and of the Spaniards 1,200 (Desp. 29 July; Napoleon's Correspondence, 21 Aug.) ' Il parait que c'est un homme, ce Wellesley,' was Napoleon's remark when the news reached him at Vienna (, Guerre d' Espagne, p. 87).

Meanwhile Soult had reorganised his troops, had been joined by Ney, and had made his way unopposed through passes which Wellesley believed to be well guarded, with fifty-three thousand men. Four days after the battle of Talavera he reached Plasencia, where he was upon the British line of communications. The allied armies now lay between two French armies. Wellesley, believing Soult's strength to be only half what it was, determined to march against him, leaving the Spaniards at Talavera to face Joseph. But Cuesta, perverse and incapable throughout, abandoned Talavera, and then opposed the only course open to them, to pass the Tagus at Arzobispo. This was done, however, by the British on 4 Aug., and the Spaniards followed next day. A large number of the wounded had to be left behind.

The allied armies took up positions to dispute the passage of the Tagus at Arzobispo or Almaraz. At the former the Spaniards were surprised on the 8th, but the French did not follow up their success, and on the 12th Cuesta resigned. On the 20th extreme destitution obliged the British to fall back on Badajoz. The Spanish junta complained loudly, but Wellesley refused to co-operate any longer with their armies after his experience of their breaches of faith and misbehaviour in the field. 'They are really children in the art of war,' he wrote (Desp. 25 Aug.) He warned them to avoid pitched battles, but in vain; their best army was routed at Oeaña on 19 Nov., and another under Del Parque was beaten at Alba de Tormes before the end of the month. Wellesley's position at Badajoz saved Andalusia from invasion, and, in spite of great loss from sickness, he remained there till the middle of December. The exposure of northern Portugal by Del Parque's defeat then led him to move his army to upper Beira, leaving one division under Hill at Abrantes.

The supreme command of the Portuguese army had been given to him on 6 July with the rank of marshal-general, and in August he had been made captain-general in the Spanish army. For the victories of Oporto and Talavera he was raised to the peerage on 4 Sept. as Baron Douro of Wellesley and Viscount Wellington of Talavera. The title was chosen by his brother William, apparently to minimise the change of name. He received the thanks of parliament (26 Jan. and 1 Feb. 1810) and an annuity of 2,000l. But the vote of thanks was opposed in both houses (Hansard, xv. 130, 277), and Lords Grey and Lauderdale entered a protest. The common council of London asked for an inquiry into Wellington's conduct. He was used as a means of attacking the ministry, which was weak and divided. It had been discredited by the Walcheren failure, and had lost Castlereagh and Canning. Perceval, the new head of it, was inclined to withdrawal from the Peninsula, while Lord Wellesley had joined it as foreign secretary in order to counteract such a policy (Suppl. Desp. vii. 257).

But it was not mere party spirit that found fault with Wellington. Talavera had shown that sixteen thousand British infantry could hold their ground against thirty thousand French, but otherwise it had borne no fruit; and the army had escaped disaster only by the faults of the French leaders. It had suffered much and had lost faith in its general (, Life of Sir Charles James Napier, i. 119, 126). The 'Moniteur' had expressed the hope that he would always command the English armies: 'du caractère dont il est, il essuiera de grandes catastrophes' (, p. 29). Napoleon had made peace with Austria, and even before it was signed had given orders (7 Oct. 1809) for the formation of a fresh army of a hundred thousand men, which he meant to lead into Spain at the end of the year. As Lord Liverpool afterwards wrote, 'All the officers in the army who were in England, whether they had served in Portugal or not, entertained and avowed the most desponding views as to the result of the war in that country. . . and not a mail arrived from Lisbon which did not bring letters at that time from officers of rank and situation in the army. . . avowing their opinions as to the probability and even necessity of a speedy evacuation of the country' (Suppl. Desp. 10 Sept. 1810).

But Wellington himself never despaired.