Page:Dictionary of National Biography volume 47.djvu/444

 (1735–1801) [q. v.] Black explained to Reid his discovery of latent heat before it was generally published; and Reid took a keen interest through life in scientific questions. He describes in 1765 some of the improvements in the steam engine lately made by Watt in Glasgow. Millar was a disciple of Hume, and with him Reid had lively discussions at a philosophical club which held weekly meetings. The fourteen professors, however, were anything but an harmonious body. In his letters to the Skenes (Works, pp. 40–7), Reid complains of their intrigues and factions. There were, he says, often five or six college meetings a week, which were made very disagreeable by ‘the evil spirit of party’ (Works, p. 43). John Anderson, professor of natural philosophy, was constantly quarrelling with his colleagues, and was described to some students by the professor of humanity as a ‘detestable member of society.’ Lawsuits ultimately resulted from these quarrels, and Reid was frequently appealed to as an authority. He seems to have acted with impartiality and dignity. He also served upon many committees for managing the college property and other business (Notes from the university records kindly sent by the Rev. Professor Dickson).

Reid retired from the active duties of his professorship in 1780, when Archibald Arthur [q. v.] was appointed to be his assistant with part of the salary. Reid occupied himself in preparing for publication the substance of his lectures. They appeared as essays on the ‘Intellectual Powers’ (1785), and upon the ‘Active Powers’ (1788). He continued to live in Glasgow, where in 1792 his wife died. They had had a ‘numerous family;’ two sons and two daughters died after reaching maturity. The only survivor was the wife of Patrick Carmichael, M.D., son of Gerstom Carmichael, Hutcheson's predecessor at Glasgow, and, according to Sir W. Hamilton, the ‘real founder of the Scottish school of philosophy’ (, Works, p. 30 n.). Mrs. Carmichael took care of her father, who suffered from deafness and loss of memory. He continued, however, to take an interest in science, and rubbed up his old mathematical knowledge. In 1796 he paid a visit to his friend, Dr. James Gregory, at Edinburgh, and saw something of Playfair and Dugald Stewart. He was in apparently good health, and after returning to Glasgow amused himself with gardening and with algebraical problems. He had an attack in September, and died of paralysis on 7 Oct. 1796.

Reid was below the middle size, but had great athletic power. His portrait, painted by Raeburn during his last visit to Edinburgh, belongs to Glasgow University; and a medallion by Tassie, taken in his eighty-first year, in the National Portrait Gallery, Edinburgh, is said to be a very good likeness. Reid's obvious characteristic was the strong and cautious ‘common sense’ which also dictated his philosophy. He was thoroughly independent, strictly economical, and uniformly energetic in the discharge of his duties. He was amiable in his family, delighted in young children, some of whom, it is said, ‘noticed the peculiar kindness of his eye;’ and was as charitable as his means permitted. Stewart mentions a gift to his former parishioners of New Machar, during a scarcity of 1782, which would have been out of proportion to his means had it not been for his rigid economy, and of which he endeavoured to conceal the origin. From the few letters preserved, he appears to have been remarkable for the warmth and steadiness of his friendships.

Reid is the leading representative of the school of ‘common sense.’ This phrase had been frequently used by previous writers (many references are given in Sir W. Hamilton's elaborate note A in Works, pp. 742–803). Among them was Buffier, whose ‘Traité des Premières Vérités’ was published in 1717; an English translation appeared in 1780, with a title-page and preface accusing Reid, Oswald, and Beattie of plagiarism. Reid had probably not seen Buffier when his ‘Inquiry’ was published, and the accusation only shows the accuser's ignorance (see Hamilton in Works, pp. 786–9). By ‘common sense’ Reid meant to imply, not vulgar opinion, but the beliefs common to rational beings as such. Reid's scientific tastes led him to an unqualified admiration of the doctrines associated with the names of Bacon and Newton. He held that philosophy might be pursued as successfully as the physical sciences if treated by the same methods. He agrees, therefore, with Locke in appealing to ‘experience,’ and follows Locke's lead in basing philosophy upon psychology investigated as a science of observation and by inductive methods. Hume, as he held, had been misled into scepticism, because, while attempting to apply scientific methods, he had accepted the ‘ideal system’ due to Des Cartes. Reid's great merit, according to himself (Works, p. 86), was his attack upon this system. He modestly adds that his own theory was due not to genius but to ‘time’ and to the arguments of Berkeley and Hume themselves. The assumption that we could only know