Page:Dictionary of National Biography volume 47.djvu/255

 [see ].

On the question whether military operations upon an extensive scale should be begun at the hottest season of the year, in a locality ‘where the fierceness of the heat is reputed to exceed that of any other district’ (see Dalhousie's despatch to the secret committee, dated 7 April 1849, continuation of papers relating to the Panjáb), Dalhousie concurred in the opinion of the commander-in-chief, Lord Gough, that ‘a fearful loss of life among the British troops’ would be the consequence of such a movement, and that therefore it should not be attempted. After this decision had been arrived at, the situation was somewhat complicated by the fact that the resident at Lahore, Sir Frederick Currie [q. v.], had despatched a force from the troops at his disposal to reinforce Lieutenant Edwardes. Dalhousie, while adhering to his previous opinion, confirmed the action of the resident, who had not exceeded his powers. Currie's force was strengthened by the commander-in-chief by the addition of seven thousand men, of whom a third were British troops, together with thirty-four guns. But with these reinforcements Lord Gough sent an intimation that the entire force would not be strong enough to take Multán. Multán was nevertheless besieged, but, owing to the defection of Shír Sing, the commandant of the Sikh force sent from Lahore, who went over to the enemy with ten guns, the siege had to be raised, and it was not until 22 Jan. 1849, after the force before it had been largely reinforced from Bombay, that Multán was taken. Meanwhile Dalhousie left Calcutta early in October, and went into camp at Makhu. During the campaign which followed he exercised a close supervision over the proceedings of the commander-in-chief—a supervision which was not unattended by friction between those two high authorities, and which he subsequently felt himself compelled to modify. When the war was brought to an end by the crushing victory which Lord Gough won over the Sikh army at Guzarát, and by Sir Walter Gilbert's successful pursuit of the remnant of the Sikh army and of their Afghán allies, Dalhousie was created a marquis, receiving at the same time, together with all concerned in the campaign, the thanks of both houses of parliament. The future of the Panjáb had then to be decided. Lord Hardinge had abstained from annexing it, and had entrusted the government to a council of regency composed of Sikh sirdárs and presided over by the resident at Lahore. Sir Henry Montgomery Lawrence [q. v.], who held that office, had been compelled by the state of his health to go to England, and was still absent from India when the Multán outrage occurred; but on hearing of it he at once returned, and was present at the battle of Chilliánwalla. His brother, John Laird Mair Lawrence [q. v.], was commissioner of the Trans-Satlaj districts. Dalhousie at an early stage of the war had formed a decided impression that the annexation of the whole country and the subversion of Sikh rule were essential. Before, however, arriving at a final decision, he carefully considered the objections to that course which were powerfully urged by Sir Henry Lawrence, and were shared in a less degree by his brother John. Feeling that hesitation and delay would give rise to disorder, Dalhousie acted on his own responsibility, and on 29 March 1849 declared the Panjáb to be a British province.

For its administration Dalhousie established a board composed of three members, of whom Henry Lawrence was president, with John Lawrence and Charles Grenville Mansel [q. v.], a Bengal civilian, reputed to be a good financier, as his colleagues. Mansel in less than two years was succeeded by Robert (afterwards Sir Robert) Montgomery [q. v.], an old friend and schoolfellow of the Lawrences. The board was by no means unsuccessful, and introduced into the Panjáb a good system of administration. The leading features of the new system were that the administration was conducted partly by civil servants and partly by military officers, and that each district was placed under one head, who, with his assistants, exercised judicial as well as administrative functions. A similar system had been in force for some years in Mysore, and more recently had been introduced into Sind, where, however, the personnel of the administration was entirely military. It worked so well in the Panjáb that it was afterwards introduced into Burma, and, in fact, into all the territories which have since been annexed; but the efficiency of the board was seriously impaired by the strong differences of opinion which existed between the two Lawrences. That Dalhousie should have entrusted the administration of the newly annexed province to a board has often been considered strangely inconsistent with his general views, which were much opposed to boards for administrative purposes; but there can be little doubt that in resorting to this measure in this particular case he was largely influenced by the difficulty of disposing of Sir Henry Lawrence, who at the time of the annexation held the post of resident at Lahore, and in that capacity had