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 and retreated. Yet it is not unlikely that his invasion had acted as a check on Spanish aggression, since for nearly two years Georgia remained unmolested.

But in the spring of 1742 came the crisis which was to form the most glorious incident in Oglethorpe's career as a colonist and a soldier. Thanks in part to Oglethorpe's arrangement, in part to the natural features of the position, an attack on the colony by land was fraught with difficulty. The colony was covered by St. Simon's Island, and no invading force could with safety leave that position in the rear. The island was guarded by a small fort — St. Simon's — to the south, by Frederica to the north. The only approach to Frederica was flanked by a dense forest, offering a secure protection to a defending force. Oglethorpe abandoned and destroyed St. Simon's, and concentrated the whole strength of his defence on Frederica. He was well served with information by his Indian scouts. At the first approach of the Spanish vanguard he made a sally and beat them off. With a force ill-organised and of doubtful stability, a display of personal prowess was sure to be of service, and the knight-errant temper always present in Oglethorpe made such a line of action attractive. Fighting at the head of his troop, he captured two Spaniards with his own hands. But the real brunt of the battle came later, when the flanking force, protected by the wood, attacked the main body of the Spaniards. The invaders fared much as Braddock fared thirteen years later in the Ohio valley, and were routed with heavy loss. Yet Oglethorpe was glad to avert by stratagem the possibility of a second attack. A Frenchman had joined the English as a volunteer, and had then deserted to the invaders. Oglethorpe astutely used him as a channel for conveying to the Spanish commander belief that the English were ready, and even eager, to meet a second invasion. He also said that he expected a fleet to come to his relief. By a strange and fortunate chance his statement was confirmed by the appearance of some English ships out at sea. Oglethorpe's combination of daring and strategy succeeded. Georgia was safe, and the pauper colony had moreover served its secondary purpose ; it had proved a bulwark to the more prosperous neighbour on the northern front frontier. Whitfield did not exaggerate the severity of the danger and the insufficiency of the means whereby it was repelled when he wrote: 'The deliverance of Georgia from the Spaniards is such as cannot be paralleled but by some instances out of the Old Testament.' Yet the peril was not yet at an end. One of the chief elements of danger was the 'self-sufficiency,' as one of their own colonists called it, of the officials of South Carolina. Not only were they supine in raising forces, but a pilot known to be a traitor m the employment of Spain was suffered to make himself well 'acquainted with Charlestown harbour.

Oglethorpe had other difficulties to face. The Duke of Newcastle was then secretary for the southern department, and as such had control over colonial affairs. The duke's ignorance of colonial geography was astounding, while the ministry carried on without spirit a war into which they had been dragged against their will. During the spring of 1743 Oglethorpe, while dreading the annihilation of his colony — a blow which would at once have involved South Carolina in invasion, and probably in servile war — had to confine himself to utilising his Indian allies for raids into the neighbourhood of St. Augustine. On 13 Feb. of that year he was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general. Hitherto the title of general, habitually applied to him in connection with Georgian affairs, was purely honorary and conventional.

The military operations against Spain soon involved Oglethorpe in financial difficulties, which compelled his return to England. The state of affairs well illustrates the unsatisfactory want of method in the colonial administration of Great Britain in those days. No fixed sum was voted for the defence of Georgia, nor is there any evidence that instructions were given to Oglethorpe authorising him to spend money on that account. Yet it was manifest that supplies and the like must be paid for, and Oglethorpe accordingly incurred the necessary expenses, and met them by drawing bills on his English agent, a Mr. Verelst, while at the same time he appears to have made it clear to Verelst by the form of the bills that the money was for the king's service. Verelst therefore applied to Walpole, who was then chancellor of the exchequer, and Walpole authorised him to draw on the treasury for the sums required to meet the bills. After a time, however, Walpole withdrew this authority; but before the notification of this change reached Oglethorpe he had drawn more bills. The matter was then referred to the lords justices, who had been specially authorised to supervise the finances of Georgia. They approved of the expenditure ; but when the bills were presented at the treasury, the lords of that department refused to meet them, nor is there any proof that Oglethorpe was ever reimbursed.

It was Oglethorpe's intention to revisit

