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 the advance, now undertook the charge of the rear, and it was chiefly owing to his courage and alertness that the retreat was conducted with perfect order and complete success. So silently and swiftly was it begun that the Duke of Cumberland was unaware of the movement before the highlanders were two days' march from Derby. The highlanders, by their method of marching, were almost beyond pursuit even by cavalry, when Murray, with the rear-guard, was on the 17th detained at Clifton in Cumberland by the breaking down of some baggage wagons. Next morning the advanced guard of the duke appeared on the adjoining heights, and, desiring to check the pursuit, Murray despatched a message to the prince for a reinforcement of a thousand men, his purpose being, by a midnight march, to gain the flank of the pursuers, and, according to the method adopted at Prestonpans, take them by surprise in the early morning. The prince replied by ordering him, without risking any engagement, to join the main body with all speed at Penrith. But Murray, probably deeming retreat more hazardous than attack, disregarded the order, and posted his men strongly at the village of Clifton to await the approach of the dragoons. The sun had set, but the dragoons continued their march by moonlight, and the semi-obscurity favoured the highlanders, who, led by Murray, and disregarding the enemies' fire, rushed upon them with their claymores and drove them back with great loss. Murray thereupon hastened to obey the prince's orders, and joined the main body. The check thus given to the pursuit delivered the insurgents from further danger or annoyance. The duke dared not venture into the broken and hilly country beyond Carlisle, which he contented himself with investing, and the highlanders entering Scotland on the 20th, and marching in two divisions to Glasgow, where they levied a heavy subsidy, proceeded to besiege the castle of Stirling. It was probably the refusal of the prince to send a reinforcement to Murray while in difficulties at Clifton that led Murray on 6 Jan. 1746 to present to him a memorial that he should from time to time call a council of war, and that upon sudden emergencies a discretionary power should be vested in those who had commands. To the memorial the prince replied on the 7th, refusing to adopt the advice proposed, and complaining at length of the attempt to limit his prerogative (Hist. MSS. Comm. 7th Rep. p. 704, 12th Rep. App. pt. viii. p. 73).

At Stirling the insurgents were joined by reinforcements from France and the highlands, which with their lowland allies brought up their numbers to about nine thousand. On learning of the approach towards Falkirk of the English army under General Hawley, they advanced to more favourable ground, and drew up on the Plean Moor. The battle of Falkirk took place on 17 Jan. As usual the highlanders determined to make the attack before Hawley completed his dispositions. His men had also to contend with a storm of wind and rain which beat in their faces. The right wing was led by Murray, who fought on foot, sword in hand, at the head of the Macdonalds of Keppoch. He gave orders that they should reserve their fire till within twelve paces of the enemy. This so broke the charge of the dragoons that the highlanders were able to mingle in their ranks, and engage in a hand-to-hand struggle, where their peculiar mode of fighting at once gave them the advantage. In a few seconds the dragoons were in headlong flight, and breaking through the infantry assisted to complete the confusion caused by the furious attack of the highlanders in other parts of the line. So completely panic-stricken were the English soldiers that, had the pursuit been followed up with sufficient vigour, the highland victory might have been as signal as at Prestonpans ; but the slightness of the resistance made to their onset caused the highlanders to discredit their good fortune. Dreading that the retreat might be but a feint, they hesitated to pursue until Hawley was able to withdraw safely towards Edinburgh. After his retirement the siege of Stirling was resumed, but they were unable to effect its capture before the approach of a powerful force under Cumberland compelled them after blowing up their powder stored in the church of St. Ninians to retreat northwards towards Inverness,where reinforcements were expected from France. Murray deemed such a precipitate retreat decidedly imprudent, as tending seriously to discourage the supporters of the prince in other parts of the country (Jacobite Correspondence of the Atholl Family, p. 184). He also urged that a stand should be made in Atholl, and offered to do so with two thousand men (ib. p. 185). His counsels were, however, overruled, and on reaching Crieff on 2 Feb. the army was formed in two divisions, the highlanders under the prince marching to Inverness by the direct mountain route, while the lowland regiments, led by Murray, proceeded along the eastern coast by Angus and Aberdeen. Murray joined the prince while he was investing Fort George. A small garrison had been left in it by Lord Loudoun, who for greater safety withdrew into Ross ; but Murray cleverly surmounted the difficulty of attacking him there by collecting a fleet of fishing boats, with which he crossed