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 which was scarcely lessened during the whole day. Mathews wished to wait for Lestock's ships to close up, but found the allies slipping away to the southward and likely to escape him. This, he quite well understood, was what they wanted to do. Between France and England war had not been declared, and the primary object of the French fleet was to lend its support to the Spanish to break the blockade; if that could be done without fighting, so much the better. But besides that, the French also intended, or Mathews believed that they intended, to make for the Straits of Gibraltar, to join the Brest fleet, and thus the more effectually to cover the invasion to be attempted from Dunkirk [see, d. 1749]. This it was Mathews's obvious duty to prevent. It was therefore impossible for him to allow the allies to get away to the south while he was waiting for Lestock. He was obliged to fight, and at once. About one o'clock he made the signal to engage; and in the Namur, closely followed by Captain James Cornewall [q. v.] in the Marlborough, ran down towards the rear of the allies, and brought the Spanish admiral to close action. In doing this, however, he neglected to haul down the signal for the line of battle; the two signals were flying simultaneously, and, under the existing circumstances, were irreconcilable. No one knew what to do. Those whose heads were clear and hearts were sound did close the enemy and engage [see ]; but many were muddle-headed, some were perhaps shy, and Lestock—it was averred—was wickedly glad to see his commander-in-chief in difficulties, and would do nothing to help him out. Thus left to themselves, the Namur and Marlborough suffered very severely, and though they beat the Spanish ships opposed to them out of the line, the Marlborough was dismasted and the Namur temporarily disabled.

About five o'clock the French tacked to the assistance of the Spaniards. The ships of the English van thought that the object of this manœuvre was to double on and overwhelm them, and tacked to the northward [see ]. There were no directing signals; the admiral had apparently lost his head, and no one ventured to take his place. A sort of panic set in, and the English fleet fled to the northward, the French appearing to chase them, but in reality intent only on rescuing the Spaniards. The Spaniards even neglected to secure the Marlborough, disabled, deserted, and wellnigh defenceless though she was. They did, however, recapture the Poder, and, content with that and with having saved the Spanish admiral, turned back, steering again to the southward. The English, on the other hand, continued during the night standing to the north; it was only towards daybreak of the 12th that they recovered themselves, and turned to the south, following the enemy in line of battle. The enemy now had no inclination to stay; but several of their ships were disabled and in tow; the Poder, which was the worst, they abandoned to the English, and she was burnt by Mathews's order. Still, the allies' retreat was very much hampered by the other crippled ships, and by nightfall the English fleet, in fair line, was within three or four miles of them, when Mathews again made the signal to bring to. At daybreak on the 13th the enemy was almost out of sight to the south-west; Mathews gave up the chase, and, after trying to get back to Hyères roads, finally reached Port Mahon in the early days of March. His health had been for some time failing, and in August 1744 he was allowed to resign the command and to return home overland.

As the result of the battle the blockade was fairly broken; reinforcements and supplies were sent to the Spanish army in Italy, and the course of the war was turned in favour of the allies. But what specially enraged the people of England was the too evident fact that the English fleet had met a Franco-Spanish fleet of inferior force, and had gained no decisive advantage over it, if, indeed, it had not been worsted. Feeling, both afloat and ashore, ran exceedingly high; and the House of Commons in 1745 passed an address to the king praying that an official inquiry might be held. There were, in consequence, a great many courts-martial; some ten or a dozen captains were tried for misconduct and cashiered. Lestock, who in popular opinion was the main, if not the sole cause of the miscarriage, was acquitted, promoted, and employed again. Mathews was also tried in 1746 on charges preferred against him by Lestock, charges of having taken the fleet into action in an irregular and confused manner, of having neglected to give the necessary orders, of having fled from the enemy, and of having afterwards given up the chase when there was every prospect of being able to bring the enemy to action on advantageous terms. And these charges were all maintained by the evidence. It was alleged in his favour that Mathews had fought bravely; it was proved against him that he had deserted the Marlborough, the Poder, and the Berwick; and after a trial of unprecedented length he was sentenced to be dismissed the service, June 1747. Meantime Mathews was busying