Page:Dictionary of National Biography volume 20.djvu/109

 principle. He declared that the cause of quarrel, the American war, had passed, and that there was therefore no reason why he should not act with North. But his late censures on North had not been confined to the minister's persistence in the war, he had attacked North's character as a statesman, had maintained that he was a bad and corrupt minister, and had threatened him with impeachment. Besides, North was, and remained, a tory, while Fox had embraced the principles of the Rockingham whigs. Fox himself declared that nothing could justify the junction but success; he hoped that it would lead to the establishment of a strong administration which would be able to resist the intrigues of the crown; the king was to be treated with respect, but was to have only the semblance of power, and there was to be no government by departments (Memorials, ii. 38, iv. 40, 102). The coalition ruined the whigs, disgusted the nation, and was overthrown by the king. George struggled hard against it; he hated Fox not merely for political reasons, but because he believed that he encouraged the Prince of Wales in evil courses, and in unfilial conduct (ib. i. 269). The prince was intimate with Fox, and upheld him as a politician, greatly to his father's annoyance. Although the king used every effort to exclude Fox from the administration (Courts and Cabinets, i. 169, 172, 213), he was beaten by the coalition, and on 2 April Fox took office as foreign secretary with North and under the headship of the Duke of Portland. He was re-elected for Westminster on the 7th without opposition, though amid some hissing.

The coalition was violently disapproved by the nation; it offended the democratic party equally with the court, and was held up to public ridicule both in print and in caricatures (e.g. by Sayer in the ‘Medal’ and the ‘Mask,’ in the ‘Drivers of the State-coach’ and ‘Razor's Levee,’ and by Gillray in his double picture, ‘The Astonishing Coalition’). As minister Fox was respectful to the king, but he could get no more in return than bare civility, for George smarted under his defeat, and was determined to get rid of his new ministers. In foreign politics Fox tried to follow the line which has already been noticed in the account of his official work during the Rockingham administration; he describes the formation of ‘a continental alliance as a balance to the house of Bourbon’ as his guiding principle. He was thwarted by the indifference of the king and the unwillingness of Frederic of Prussia. In May he supported Pitt's resolutions for reform of parliament (Speeches, ii. 172), while North opposed them. By his persuasion the ministers pledged themselves to obtain a grant of 100,000l. a year for the prince. The king proposed 50,000l. a year to be taken from his own civil list. On 17 June it seemed likely that the matter would end in the dismissal of the ministers, but it was arranged by the prince himself. Fox acted in this affair rather as a friend to the prince than as a minister of the crown (, Memoirs, iii. 111). With respect to Ireland he exhorted the lord-lieutenant, Lord Northington, ‘not to be swayed in the slightest degree by the armed volunteers' associations;’ he considered that the concessions of 1782 ‘closed the account,’ and would have nothing yielded to threats (Memorials, ii. 163). The condition of Indian finance, the abuses of the administration, and the conduct of the court of proprietors in retaining Warren Hastings as governor-general of Bengal rendered it necessary to reform the government of India, and on 18 Nov. Fox brought in a bill for that purpose; the conception and the particulars of the bill must be ascribed to Burke, but Fox made the measure his own and recommended it with uncommon power (, Recollections, i. 55). Although he was conscious that by bringing in this India bill before the ministry was firmly established he was risking his power, he did not hesitate to incur that danger ‘when the happiness of so many millions was at stake’ (ib. p. 219). He exposed the deplorable condition of the company, defended the recall of Hastings, and, as illustrations of the bad government of which he was the principal agent, dwelt on the iniquities of the transactions with Cheyt Sing and the begums of Oude and the Rohilla war. In order to remedy abuses he proposed to constitute a supreme council in England, consisting of seven commissioners, to be named by the legislature, who should hold office for four years and have complete control over government, patronage, and commerce. At the end of their period of office the right of nomination was to vest in the crown. A board of assistant-directors chosen from the largest proprietors was to manage commercial details; these assistants were to be appointed in the first instance for four years by parliament, and vacancies were to be filled up by the proprietors. Provision was made in a second bill for giving security to landowners and for certain other matters (Speeches, ii. 194). The first bill was carried in the commons, but the opposition raised a strong feeling against it by representing that it struck at chartered rights and at royal prerogative. All public companies were said to be endangered; the bill was declared to provide opportunities