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 which arose out of the election of the king's son-in-law, Frederick, elector palatine, to the Bohemian throne. He appears to have advocated an attempt to come to an understanding with Spain while preparations were simultaneously made to procure money and allies for the defence of the Palatinate; so that if Frederick were driven out of Bohemia, it might still be possible to maintain him in his hereditary possessions. It is always difficult in the case of a diplomatist to know how far he is personally associated with schemes which he is directed to carry out, but it must at least be noted that in June 1620 Digby accompanied Buckingham on a visit to the Spanish ambassador Gondomar, when a project for the partition of the Dutch Netherlands between England and Spain was discussed. Whatever Digby may have thought about the matter, it must be remembered that ill-feeling towards the Dutch as the opponents of England in trade was always most powerful with those who were ready to smooth over the religious differences between England and Spain. In supporting the Spanish alliance, however, Digby had no notion of making England simply subservient to Spain, and in March 1621, after the expulsion of Frederick from Bohemia, he was sent to Brussels to urge the Archduke Albert to direct a suspension of arms in the Palatinate as a preliminary to a negotiation for peace which he was subsequently to undertake at Vienna. As far as words went the archduke was ready to give satisfaction, and Digby, after his return to England, received instructions on 23 May for his mission to the emperor, Ferdinand II.

On 4 July Digby reached Vienna. He was authorised to procure a suspension of the ban of the empire, which had been pronounced against Frederick, and to make peace on the basis of the abandonment by Frederick of his claims to Bohemia, and the abandonment by Ferdinand of any attempt to inflict punishment on Frederick. Verbally satisfaction was given to the ambassador's demands, but it was evident that neither party had any real wish to terminate the strife. Before the end of September the Duke of Bavaria had made himself master, in the emperor's name, of the Upper Palatinate, and Mansfeld, who commanded Frederick's unpaid troops in that district, was obliged to retreat to the Lower Palatinate. Digby borrowed money and melted his plate to provide 10,000l. for the temporary defence of Heidelberg, and hastened back to England to support James in asking supplies from parliament to enable him to intervene for the protection of Frederick's dominions. On 31 Oct. he was in England. On 21 Nov. he laid his policy before the houses. Money, he said, must be sent to pay the forces in the Lower Palatinate during the winter, and an army must be sent thither in the spring, which would cost 900,000l. The question of adopting or rejecting Digby's proposal was never fairly discussed. James quarrelled with his parliament on constitutional grounds, and a speedy dissolution put an end to all hopes of regaining the lost ground, except so much as might be allowed by the mere clemency of Spain.

With the dissolution of 1621 Digby's chance of bringing an independent policy to a successful result was at an end. He returned to Spain in 1622 to carry out James's plan of trusting to the goodwill of Spain, and to put once more into shape that marriage treaty which had been allowed to sleep in 1618. The government of Philip IV (who had succeeded in 1621) was chiefly anxious to gain time, and met Digby in the most friendly way; and James was so pleased with the progress of events that on 15 Sept. 1622 he created his ambassador Earl of Bristol.

It was not long before James took alarm at the capture of Heidelberg by Tilly. Bristol was at once ordered to obtain the assurance that the town and castle should be restored. As might have been expected, the Spaniards would give no such assurance. Bristol, however, pushed on the marriage treaty, and the articles, with the exception of the important one relating to the English catholics, were in such a state of forwardness that in January 1623 they were accepted by James. Bristol seems to have felt that, as matters stood, there was no hope of recovering the Palatinate except by the goodwill of Spain, and to have conceived it to be impossible that Philip should agree to the marriage treaty unless he wanted to help in the restoration of the Palatinate.

The arrival of Charles and Buckingham at Madrid on 7 March 1623 took the negotiation out of Bristol's hands. Before long the ambassador gave deep offence to the prince by believing too easily a rumour that Charles had come with the purpose of declaring himself a catholic, and by assuring him that, though he was not in favour of such a proceeding, he was ready to place himself at his disposal in the matter. During the latter part of Charles's visit Bristol's influence was thrown on the side of keeping up friendly relations with Spain, and he drew upon himself the ill-will of the prince by supporting a scheme for the education of the eldest son of the elector palatine at Vienna. On 29 Aug. he wrote to the king, setting forth plainly