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Drake not to be. The queen was unwilling to push matters with vigour. It was not till 23 May that Lord Charles Howard, having joined Drake at Plymouth, was able to announce his intention of lying 'between England and the coast of Spain, to watch the coming of the Spanish forces.' This half-measure was not at all what Drake had wanted, and even it was frustrated by the weather. Violent storms compelled them to return to Plymouth on 13 June, having seen nothing of the Spaniards, who, they supposed, might by that time have landed in Scotland or Ireland. It was still his opinion, wrote Howard on the 14th, as well as that of Drake, Hawkyns, and Frobisher, that it would have been best to attack the Spaniards on their own coasts. Several times during the next few weeks they attempted to put to sea, but always to be driven back by a westerly gale. It was afterwards known that the same succession of bad weather had scattered the Spanish fleet, and compelled it to take refuge in Corunna. It was 6 July before it was all collected, and after the necessary repairs it finally put to sea on the 12th. The English fleet, in three divisions, was meantime spread across the entrance of the Channel, Drake being stationed off Ushant (Howard to Walsingham, 6 July); but a fresh southerly breeze blew them back to Plymouth (13 July), and at the same time gave the Spaniards a fair run across the Bay of Biscay. Off Ushant, however, these came into a succession of violent storms (, ii. 219), which prevented their keeping together. It was not till Saturday, 20 July, that they were once more collected off the Lizard. It has been said, and repeated over and over again, that they were tempted to the English coast, contrary to their instructions, by the chance of catching the English fleet at an advantage in the Sound (, p. 254). This is curiously incorrect; for the appointed rendezvous in case of separation was Mount's Bay (, ii. 27), and the king's instructions, which are both definite and minute, contain not one word about hugging the French coast or avoiding the enemy, but, on the contrary, based on the supposition that the main fleet with Howard would be off the North Foreland, having left Drake with a detached squadron to guard the mouth of the Channel, they ordered that Drake, if fallen in with, should be attacked and destroyed (ib.ii. 9). The question of Drake having joined Howard in the Straits was considered and provided for; the other and actual contingency, of Howard having joined Drake off Plymouth, does not seem to have been entertained. But Spanish writers have freely blamed Medina-Sidonia, not for appearing off Plymouth, but for not attacking the English fleet penned up in the Sound, according to the advice of his council (ib. i. 67).

An old and apparently well-founded tradition relates that when the news of the Armada being off the Lizard was brought to the lord high admiral, he and the other admirals and captains of the fleet were playing bowls on the Hoe; that Howard wished to put to sea at once, but that Drake prevented him, saying, 'There's plenty of time to win this game and to thrash the Spaniards too' (cf. J., Phœnix Britannicus, p. 345). The popular picture by Seymour Lucas (Royal Academy, 1880), showing a figure on the left pointing to the Armada in the distance, is, however, based on some misconception of the story; for the Lizard is more than fifty miles from the Hoe, and the line of sight is effectually stopped by Penlee Point. During the night the Spanish fleet passed Plymouth, and early the next morning was assailed by the English, who had worked out of the Sound during the night, and were now well to windward of their formidable enemy. Howard, as well as Drake, had been anxious to stave off the crisis which the shuffling policy of the queen had forced on the country; but now, in face of the danger, they met it with a willing resolution. Before the fighting began they had obtained the weather gage and had no difficulty in keeping it. Their ships of force were far fewer than those of the Spaniards; but they were more weatherly, sailed better, were better handled, and carried heavier guns, which were worked by men familiar with the exercise. The Spanish ships, with enormous castles at the bow and stern, sailed, in comparison, like barges. They were crowded with men, but these men were neither sailors nor artillerymen; their guns were not only small, but were worked by men utterly inexperienced; their strength lay entirely in musketry or in hand-to-hand conflict; and against a foe whom they could not catch, and who pounded them with great guns from a safe distance, they were practically helpless (, i. 71–7;, xii. 394–5). The disproportion of size and number was indeed too great to permit of any speedy settlement of the question; but as the English followed the enemy up Channel the advantage was telling in their favour. Each day more or less partial engagements took place, and the policy decided on by Medina-Sidonia, of making his way to Calais without stopping to fight—a policy distinctly contrary to his instructions—necessarily threw into the hands of the English all such ships as from any cause dropped astern. Of these the most noteworthy was Nuestra Señora del