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 of the ‘forward’ policy. Encouraged by his success in Baluchistan, he supported the policy of opening up communications beyond the Indus and subjugating the unruly tribesmen of the Himalaya. This policy brought about a succession of frontier campaigns. During this period the gradual approach of Russia to the northern frontier of Afghanistan and the menace of a Russian attack upon India were the principal military preoccupations, and the chief argument of the advocates of the ‘forward’ policy was the necessity, in view of this menace, of obtaining better control of the tribes of the North-Western Frontier, and thereby more influence in Afghanistan. White's command began with a small expedition in 1894 against the Abor tribe on the North-Eastern Frontier. This was followed in 1895 by the more considerable Chitral campaign, due to the revolt of Umra Khan, who besieged in Chitral fort the commissioner, (Sir) George Scott Robertson [q.v.], and a small garrison. The expedition of relief which was successfully carried through had more than local importance in view of Russian approaches to the Pamirs. The Chitral campaign was followed in 1897 by a succession of outbreaks along the frontier, which were the cause of expeditions into the Tochi Valley of Baluchistan, the Swat Valley, and against the Mohmands; and before these were terminated the most warlike and important tribes of the frontier, the Afridis and the Orakzais, rose and burned the British forts in the Khyber Pass. There followed the Tirah campaign, the most considerable military enterprise of which India had been the scene since the days of the Mutiny. While the responsibility for the policy of these expeditions rested with the viceroy, the Earl of Elgin, who had followed the tradition established by Lord Lansdowne, White was responsible for their planning and organization. All of them were successful in obtaining the objects immediately aimed at, but the permanent gains were small. It has been said, with reason, that a less ambitious enterprise than the Tirah campaign, more swiftly executed, would have had better results. White probably hoped that by operations on a considerable scale the problem would be solved once and for all. In that he was not successful. His term as commander-in-chief was in other respects remarkable for the training which he inaugurated (particularly of the British troops) in the intricacies of mountain warfare, and for the advancement of the musketry instruction of the Indian army. For his services as commander-in-chief he was made G.C.B., and at the end of 1897 he was appointed quartermaster-general at the War Office.

In September 1899, on the outbreak of the Boer War, White was sent in command to Natal with the task of saving that province from invasion. There he was confronted with a far more serious problem than any created by the tribes of the Indian frontier, a problem more serious indeed than had confronted any British general then alive. His predecessor in command in Natal, Sir William Penn Symons [q.v.], had taken up a forward position on the frontier at Dundee; and though White desired to concentrate his whole force in the neighbourhood of Ladysmith, which was the strategically wise course, he allowed himself to be overruled by the dashing and adventurous Symons, and the campaign in Natal began with the British forces divided. At that time no one believed that the Boers would show the tactical skill and cohesion which they in fact displayed, and the advantage which their mobility conferred upon them was much underrated. There were, therefore, arguments on behalf of the plan adopted, mistaken though it proved to be. After a successful engagement with the Boers at Talana (20 October), in which Symons lost his life, the Dundee column made good its retreat to Ladysmith. The next day the Boers were again repulsed by Major-General French at Elandslaagte, but by that time the horns of the invasion had extended far into Natal. An unfortunate night enterprise at Nicholson's Nek, which ended in a complete failure, ruined White's plan for engaging the enemy at Lombard's Kop (30 October), and the whole of his forces were shut up in Ladysmith (2 November). It would have been possible for White to retreat across the river Tugela, but it would have been a hazardous undertaking, entailing the abandonment of a large quantity of ammunition and stores, while the moral effect would have been even more considerable than was that of the investment. White maintained that by attracting the Boers to Ladysmith he preserved the rest of Natal from invasion. In this he was shown by the result to have been right. The balance of military argument is in favour of White's decision in a very difficult and critical situation. It has been said that White's defence was lacking in enterprise and that his choice of the lines of defence was not the best. Mistakes—common in war—there may have been, yet there is no question but that he kept 572