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 Lord Rosebery remitted as orders from Her Majesty's government the instructions suggested to him by its representative in Egypt; and a British battalion, homeward bound, was diverted from the Canal and marched to Cairo for an outward and visible sign. Abbas ate his bitter words, and nationalism went to ground again. Reviewing his stewardship in after years Cromer judged this to be the last round he had to fight against official obstruction; and in fact all serious opposition above ground ceased henceforward. Abbas, saying he understood that he might sit on the box of the state coach, but not touch the reins, consoled himself with private finance. Ministers, lapsing into ciphers, took their tone from Mustapha Fehmi, who replaced Nubar in the autumn of 1895. Cromer, once more confident of the future, reverted to the great projects of Tewfik's last years. Surveys for a Nile dam were put in hand with the cordial approval of every husbandman in Egypt, and a curtain of masonry began to rise above the cataract. Cromer had intended to await its completion and the expansion of revenue which was certain to follow, before allowing the eager sirdar to begin the realization of an even greater project, the reconquest of the Sudan. But the disaster of Adowa in 1895, leading Italy to press for some Egyptian action in the rear of Abyssinia, caused London to force Cromer's hand. Money was tight and only by a majority vote was half a million obtained from the commissioners of the Caisse, the French and the Russian commissioners forming the minority. With this the sirdar got to work, and when, on a subsequent appeal, the courts declared that the grant must be refunded to the Caisse, Cromer hardly persuaded the British Treasury to cover a debt incurred by following British instructions. Preparations were made with much secrecy. After noting the progress of the Upper Egypt railway to Sohag, to Girgeh, to the crossing of the river at Nag Hamadi, Cromer added, in his published report for 1896, that, while the restoration of Karnak engaged his attention, he had ‘nothing of military interest’ to write about. Then, suddenly, Egypt heard that there was an up-Nile campaign afoot, and that Kitchener was bound for Dongola, which, though few but soldiers knew the fact, was no place to stay in long. Cromer had urged Suakin as first objective, but had been overruled.

Throughout the further advances, which that first step inevitably entailed—to Abu Hamed, to the Atbara, and to Omdurman—the British agent, recalling his half-forgotten military terminology and tactics, and sinking a habitual distrust of soldier strategists, which he shared with Lord Salisbury, had to play minister of war, as well as to support the sirdar against both the Egyptian Cabinet and Whitehall. On all policy and plans of the campaign he was asked for and gave advice. Kitchener, if not congenial to Cromer's heart, satisfied his head (though there was to be some friction later, when the sirdar had become governor-general of the Sudan), and from Dongola in 1896 to Fashoda in 1898 Cromer accorded him his absolute trust. The conduct of the last and most perilous act of the campaign, the Fashoda meeting with the Frenchman, Marchand (Cromer had long ago warned Kitchener and London that it might happen), he was content to leave to his subordinate with only the briefest general instruction. In the final hour of their joint triumph, he was far away in northern Scotland beside the sick-bed of his wife.

He returned in the autumn of 1898, to enforce the singular Anglo-Egyptian arrangement which he had devised for excluding internationalism from the reconquered Sudan; and troubled consuls-general were advised that their nationals south of the twentieth parallel must look to British protection alone. Cromer intentionally discouraged the company promoter and all others who might exploit native populations. Lady Cromer survived her return to Cairo by a few weeks only. Bereaved and alone, her husband went to Khartoum in December to find comfort where capitulations and mixed courts were not. In Egypt, however, the clouds of internationalism were breaking. The Franco-British Agreement of 1899, defining zones of influence in Africa, cleared the way for the definitive pact of 1904, by which the burden of dualism was lifted from most of the foreign-controlled administrations just in time to save the railways. It looked as if the capitulations themselves might go, as Cromer had desired long and devoutly, because he held autonomy impossible in Egypt until there were not only more good citizens but more citizens—until, in fact, the resident Europeans both obeyed and made Egyptian laws. But this consummation he would not live to see.

He bestrode the local world with none to let or hinder. The Boer War disturbed Egypt no more than the Armenian massacres had done. While some Moslems undoubtedly welcomed our early ill  26