Page:Dictionary of National Biography, Third Supplement.djvu/140

 of these territories, assuming that they peaceably acquiesce in British rule and are ready to co-operate, irrespective of race, in maintaining the peace and furthering the prosperity of the country, should, as soon as circumstances permit, have all the advantages of self-government similar to that which is enjoyed by the inhabitants of the Cape Colony and Natal.’ At the same time it was obvious that there would have to be a period of Crown Colony government, between the annexation and the grant of full self-government. Chamberlain does not, however, seem to have recognized the expediency of a period of representative, without responsible, government, such as that afterwards set on foot by [q.v.].

Nor were Chamberlain’s utterances less successful when addressed to the capitalists of the Rand. An eyewitness has testified that a speech of his at Johannesburg actually persuaded an audience, that had come with intent of refusing, to promise a loan of thirty million pounds, the proceeds of which should be paid to the British government, as a contribution: to the cost of the War. It is true that this loan was never raised, bad times and a shortage of labour having disappointed the high hopes raised by the British successes. But such failure cannot be laid to the charge of the colonial secretary.

In dealing with the Rand magnates, Chamberlain was no less open than when dealing with the Boer leaders. Already the demand was beginning to be made for Asiatic labour, and his remarks on the subject are significant, in the light of its future history. ‘It is clear to me, and no doubt to you,’ he said at Johannesburg (17 January 1903), ‘that an overwhelming popular opinion in this very colony is opposed to such a solution. You have first to convert the people. Then you will have seen that the other great colonies of the Empire, that the opinion of the mother country itself, regard a step of this kind as retrograde and dangerous. And, lastly, if these difficulties are removed, there are serious practical obstacles in the way, which will meet you at the outset, and which, I think, justify my opinion that it would be very long indeed, even if all other difficulties were removed, before you would obtain any reliable supply from the sources which have been suggested.’

Another proof of Chamberlain’s moderation was his vetoing, in 1902, the suspension of the Cape Colony constitution as proposed by the English party in the House of Assembly, although the line taken by Sir [q.v.] at the Imperial Conference of that year may have influenced his decision. Whilst emphasizing his desire for South African federation he recognized, in a dispatch of 23 February, that nothing could be worse than federation forced upon a people before they had time thoroughly to grasp its meaning and to understand how it would affect them personally in their several states, and to come to something like a general conclusion on the subject. The harvest could not yet be reaped; but, when the Union of South Africa came into being, it owed something at least to the seed sown by Chamberlain.

He had already done good work in the cause of federation by piloting the Commonwealth of Australia Bill through the House of Commons (1900). In his attempt to maintain unimpaired the appellate jurisdiction of the Privy Council, he may have exaggerated its importance as a bond of imperial union; and the conclusion finally reached, which was that no appeal should be allowed in cases in which the question at issue was the limits inter se of the constitutional powers of the commonwealth and those of any state or states, or the limits inter se of the constitutional powers of any two or more states, without the leave of the commonwealth high court, was, in fact, a ‘confession of failure’. Nevertheless, the birth of the Commonwealth of Australia seemed a distinct step forward in the direction of Chamberlain’s ideals.

With his return from South Africa in March 1903, Chamberlain entered upon the last stage of his political life. During the South African War a tax of one shilling a quarter on imported corn had been imposed, which produced some two and a half million pounds a year without apparently affecting the price of bread. Chamberlain was in favour of retaining this small tax with the view of giving a rebate to imperial wheat; and he was bitterly disappointed by its abolition during his absence in South Africa. He was ‘under the impression that, before his departure for South Africa, his policy had received the assent of the Cabinet with the exception of the chancellor of the exchequer, Mr. [q.v.]. The absence at the time of Cabinet ministers and other circumstances prevent certainty on the subject. Later, Chamberlain wrote to the Duke of Devonshire (21 September): ‘For my part I care only for the great question of imperial unity. But for this … I would not have taken off my coat. . . . While I 114