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 confidence. Read now, the controversy between the Transvaal and British governments on the question whether the Republic was a sovereign state, and whether foreign arbitration was admissible, may seem academic. But the practical interests of many British subjects were deeply involved; whilst there were additional complaints—of the dynamite monopoly, of maladministration in Swaziland, and of other grievances. For a year Milner remained silent, studying the situation. When he spoke, it was to counsel the Dutch in Cape Colony to warn their kinsmen in the Transvaal against any fatal rashness. Henceforth, though Chamberlain was always ready to interfere if necessary, British policy was mainly directed by the man on the spot. It was the fashion amongst a certain school of radicals to regard Chamberlain as a firebrand, who was only kept in order by the influence of his more moderate colleagues. If his speeches showed moderation it was assumed that this was only because Lord Salisbury was holding him back. There appears, however, not to be a tittle of evidence for such a reading of the history.

In any case, the Bloemfontein Conference (May-June 1899) was an honest attempt on the part of the British authorities to reach a modus vivendi on the questions at issue. Its starting-point was as follows: On 4 May Milner, in a powerful and plain-spoken telegram, stated the case for intervention. ‘The true remedy’, he said, ‘is to strike at the root of all these injuries, the political impotence of the injured. What diplomatic protests will never accomplish, a fair measure of Uitlander representation would gradually but surely bring about.’ ‘The case for intervention’, he insisted, ‘is overwhelming.... The spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept permanently in the position of helots, constantly chafing over undoubted grievances and calling vainly to Her Majesty’s government for redress, does steadily undermine the influence and reputation of Great Britain and the respect for the British government within the British dominions.’ Chamberlain’s considered reply, sent on 10 May, covered the whole ground. After summarizing the details of the Uitlanders’ grievances, the most serious of which affected their ‘personal rights’, placing them ‘in a position of political, social, and educational inferiority to the Boer inhabitants of the Transvaal, and even’ endangering the security of their lives and property’, the dispatch finally stated the conclusions at which the British government had arrived. Recognizing the exceptional circumstances of the case, they had, since February 1896, intentionally refrained from any pressure on the government of the South African Republic, except in cases where there had been a distinct breach of the Convention of 1884. Reluctant as they were to depart from this attitude of reserve and expectancy, still, ‘having regard to the position of Great Britain as the paramount power in South Africa, and the duty incumbent on them to protect all British subjects residing in a foreign country, they cannot permanently ignore the exceptional and arbitrary treatment to which their fellow-countrymen and others are exposed, and the absolute indifference of the government of the Republic to the friendly representations which have been made to them on the subject’. ‘With the earnest hope of arriving at a satisfactory settlement and as a proof of their desire to maintain cordial relations with the South African Republic’, the British government proposed that a meeting should be arranged between President Kruger and Sir Alfred Milner at Pretoria. Meanwhile, the idea of a conference was already in the mind of leaders of the Dutch in Cape Colony and the Orange Free State; and the Bloemfontein Conference, which lasted from 31 May to 4 June, was welcomed by moderate men of all parties. The question was complicated by Kruger’s desire to offset any concessions he might make with regard to the franchise by gains in other directions; and by Milner’s insistence that there were other questions, besides the franchise, about which it might be necessary to make complaints. On the main subject of the Conference Milner proposed as a settlement a five years’ retrospective franchise, and a substantial increase in the number of seats in the Volksraad to be allotted to the Rand. On the third day of the Conference a counter-scheme was put forward by Kruger, which included a six months’ notice of intention to apply for naturalization; naturalization after two years’ continued registration; and the right to the franchise after continuous registration for five years after naturalization. It proved impossible to arrive at an agreement, and the Conference came to an end.

It is easy to maintain that the Bloemfontein Conference broke down on petty points; but, in fact, throughout. the negotiations Kruger never showed that spirit of conciliation without which paper concessions would have proved practically worthless. No one recognized more 112