Page:Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography Volume I Part 1.djvu/560

 wielded, and the great offices held, — Saffetes, Senators, Generals, or Judges, — by the members of a small number of wealthy families; and the chief opposition they encountered was from their feuds against each other. In the main, the government was conducted with skill and steadiness, as well for internal tranquility, as for systematic foreign and commercial aggrandisement. Within the knowledge of Aristotle, Carthage had never suffered either the successful usurpation of a despot, or any violent intestine commotion. (Aristot. Pol. ii. 8. §1.) He briefly alludes to the abortive conspiracy of Hanno (v. 6. § 2), which is also mentioned in Justin (xxi. 4). Hanno is said to have formed the plan of putting to death the Senate, and making himself despot. But he was detected, and executed under the severest tortures; all his family being put to death along with him, B.C. 340." His attempt is compared by Aristotle to that of Pausanias at Sparta. The other attempt was that of Bomilcar,B.C.. 308. (Dict. of Greek and Roman Biog. arts. Bomilcar and Hanno.) The resemblance of the Carthaginian constitution to that of Venice is by no means so close as some writers fancy.

In the later ages of the republic, when bitter factions divided the state, we read of popular tumults which are compared to those of Alexandria for their violence, as well as for the strange spectacle of boys joining in them as eagerly as the men. (Polyb. XV. 30.)

12. Military Resources and Organization. — In order to understand both the progress and the decline of Carthage, no part of her polity requires more attentive consideration than her military system. Founded as the state was without difficulty, at a distance from any formidable enemies, and soon raised by commerce to the highest prosperity, it would have been strange if her citizens had displayed any great measure of military spirit, such as that which is inseparably identified with the Roman character. There are not wanting examples of the greatest devotion in times of extreme danger; but how little occasion there was for their display, in the age during which the military system was formed, is clear from the consideration that the first invasion of the Carthaginian territory was made by Agathocles in B.C. 316, more than five centuries from the foundation of the city. As to the Libyan tribes, their predatory incursions on the cultivators of the soil were curbed by the simple defence of a line of ditch. (Appian. Pun. 32, 54, 59; Phlegon, Mirab. 18: this trench must not be confounded with that dug by the younger Scipio Africanus for a boundary between the Carthaginian and Numidian territory: .) The military system of Carthage therefore grew entirely out of that necessity for foreign conquest which was entailed upon the state, as we have seen, by the extension of her commerce. Men do not risk their lives in war merely for the acquisition of wealth, least of all when a force of dependents and mercenaries can easily be found to fight their battles for them. Nay, it would at first sight seem good policy thus to throw the burthen upon others, while the state reaped the profit; and it required the bitter lessons of experience to prove that such a force was a broken reed, in the double sense of the Hebrew prophet, piercing the hand which it failed to support. Such a resource was at hand for the Carthaginians in a threefold form: the enforced service of her Libyan subjects; the mercenary aid of the Nomad tribes; and the labour of her slaves. (1.) Naval Forces. — From the nature of the case, the earliest warlike enterprizes of Carthage were upon the sea. She not only required a powerful navy to transport her forces to Sardinia and Sicily; but she must be prepared to encounter the fleets of the Tyrrhenians and those of the Greeks of Sicily and Massilia; and, as we have seen, her first actual encounter was with the Phocaeans of Sardinia. Fortunately, our information on her naval resources and arrangements is tolerably complete: we derive most of it from Polybius and Appian. (On the general subject, see especially Polyb. i. 20, 39, vi. 52.)

One of the earliest works of the first settlers was the excavation of a spacious harbour (Cothon), within the city; with an outer harbour for transports and merchant vessels; and with docks and magazines containing everything required for the outfit of the ships. (See below under Topography.) The number of vessels of war (besides transports) thus provided for is stated at 220 (Appian. Pun. 96); but it is natural to suppose that extra arrangements could be made for a much larger number. Accordingly, we find the Carthaginians, in their Sicilian wars, with from 150 to 200 ships of war; but, in the first Punic War, they had 350 ships of war, carrying 150,000 men, at the great sea-fight with Regulus, B.C. 254. This was at the climax of their naval power; which not only suffered greatly from its repeated defeats by the Romans, but must also have lost very much of its importance when the state was deprived of its possessions in Sicily (B.C. 241), Sardinia, and Corsica (B.C. 238); besides which it was always the policy of the Barcine family (whose ascendancy dates from B.C. 247) to fight the battles of Carthage by land rather than by sea.

Triremes seem to have constituted the Carthaginian fleet during their Sicilian war; and it seems probable that they followed the Syracusan models. (Heeren, p. 246.) A tradition preserved by Pliny from Aristotle makes them the inventors of quadriremes. (Plin. vii. 57.) The war with Pyrrhus in Sicily naturally led them to adopt the larger vessels which had been introduced by the Greeks (especially by Demetrius Poliorcetes); and in the wars with Rome they generally used quinqueremes (Polyb. i 20, 27, 59, 63, et alib. Liv. xxi. 22): and the same form was adopted by the Romans from a Punic model. (Polyb. i. 20.) The admiral's ship in the battle with Duilius, which had seven banks of oars, had been taken from Pyrrhus. (Polyb. i. 23.) Polybius computes the ships lost in the First Punic War at 500 quinqueremes on the side of the Carthaginians, and 700 on that of the Romans (i. 63). Fire ships were used in the defence of the city in the Third Punic War. (Appian. Pun. 99.) The complement of men to aquinquereme was 420, namely 120 fighting men, and 300 rowers. (Polyb. i. 26.*) The rowers were public slaves, who were procured chiefly from the interior of Africa, in such numbers


 * Polybius makes this statement of the numbers of the Roman crews; but it agrees with the totals of ships and men given for the Carthaginian fleet. Heeren ascribes to a larger number of rowers in the Punic ships, that superiority over the Syrracusans and Romans in manoeuvre, which his authorities refer expressly to greater skill. (Polyb. i. 22, 51; Diod. xx. 5.) The models being alike, the number of rowers could not well be different; but those of the Carthaginians were thoroughly trained galley slaves. 