Page:Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography Volume II.djvu/1082

 1058 SYI?ACUSAE. its power The circumstances of the great siege of Syracuse by the Athenians must here be related in some detail, on account of their important bearing on all questions connected with the topography of the city, and the interest they confer on its loca- lities. At the same time it will obviously be impos- sible to do more than give a very brief sketch of that memorable contest, for the details of which the reader must refer to the narrative of Thucydides, with the copious illustrations of Arnold, Grote, and Col. Leake. It was not till the spring of B. c. 414 that the siege of Syracuse was regularly commenced. But in the autunm of 415, the Athenians had already made a demonstration against the city, and sailing into the Great Harbour, effected a landing without opposition near the Olympieum, where they esta- blished their camp on the shore, and erected a tem- porary fort at a plage called Dascon (Tliuc. vi. 66 ; Uiod. xii. 6), apparently on the inner bight of the harbour, between the mouth of the Anapus and the bay now called the Bay of Maddalena. But though successful in the battle that ensued, Nicias did not attempt to follow up his advantage, and withdrew to winter at Catana. The next spring the Athenians landed to the N. of Syracuse, at a place called Leon, about 6 or 7 stadia from the heights of Epipolae, while they established their naval station at the ad- joining peninsula of Thapsus (^Magnisi). The land trooj)s advanced at once to occupy Epipolae, tiie mi- litary importance of which was felt by both parties, and succeeded in establishing themselves there, before the Syracusans could dislodge them. They then proceeded to build a fort at a place called Lab- dalum, which is described by Thucydides as situated " on the top of the cliffs of Epipolae, looking towards Megara" (Time. vi. 97), and having occupied this with a garrison, so as to secure their communications with their fleet, they advanced to a place called Syce (ji SuKJj), where they established themselves, and began to construct with great rapidity a line of circumvallation across the plateau of Epipolae.* The construction of such a line was the customary mode of proceeding in Greek sieges, and it was with the special object of guarding against it that the Syra- cusans had in the preceding winter extended their fortifications by running a new line of wall so as to enclose the temple of Apollo Teraenites (Thuc. vi. 75), which probably extended from thence down to the Great Harbour. Nevertheless the Athenian line of circumv.allation was carried on so rapidly as to excite in them the greatest alarm. Its northern extremity was made to rest on the sea at a point called Trogilus (probably near the Scala Greco), and it was from thence carried across the table-land rations assumes that " the circle " repeatedly spoken of by Thucydides (vi.98,99,&c.), is the circuit of the lines of circumvallation. This is the construction adopted by Goller, and all earlier editors of Thu- cydides, as well as by Col. Leake ; and appears to the writer of this article by far the most natural and intelligible interpretation. ]Ir. Grote, on the contrary, as well as Dr. Arnold in his later edition adopts the suggestion of 'M. Firmin Didot that " the circle " (o kukAos) was a particular intrenchment or fortified camp of a circular form. It is difl^cult to understand the military object of such a work, as well as to reconcile it with the subsequent details of the siege operations. SYRACUSAE. of the Epipolae, to the point nearest to the Great Harbour. Alarmed at the rapid progress of this wall, the Syracusans endeavoured to interrupt it by constructing a counter or cross wall (^vwoTeixiffi-at. or iyKapcnov reTxos), directed apparently from the wall recently erected around the temple of Apnllo Temenites towards the soiithern cliff of Epipolae. (Thuc. vi. 99.) This wall was, however, carried by the Athenians by a sudden attack and destroyed, whereupon the Syracusans attempted a second coun- terwork, carried through the marshes and low ground, so as to prevent the Athenians from con- necting their works on Epipolae with the Gi'eat Harbour. But this work was, like the preceding one, taken and destroyed; and the Athenians, whose fleet had meanwhile entered the Great Harbour, and established itself there, were able to construct a strong double line of wall, extending from the cliffs of Epipolae quite down to the harbour. (76. 100 — 10-3.) On the table-land above, on the contrary, their works were still incomplete, and especially that part of the line of circumvallation near Trogilus was still in an unfinished state when Gylippus landed in Sicily, so that that commander was able to force his passage through the lines at this point, and effect an entry into Syracuse. (Id. vii. 2.) It is remark- able that the hill of Euryalus, though in fact the key of the position on the Epipolae, seems to have been neglected by Nicias, and was still undefended by any fortifications. Gylippus immediately directed his efforts to pre- vent the completion of the Athenian lines across the table-land, and obtained in the first instance an im- portant advantage by surprising the Athenian fort at Labdalum. He next began to erect another cross wall, running out from the walls of the city across the plateau, so as to cross and intersect the Athe- nian lines; and notwithstanding repeated efforts on the part of the Athenians, succeeded in carrying this on so far as completely to cut off their line of circumvallation, and render it impossible for them to complete it. (Id. vii. 4 — 6.) Both parties seem to have looked on the completion of this line as the decisive point of the siege ; Nicias finding himself unable to capture the outwork of the Syracusans, almost despaired of success, and wrote to Athens for strong reinforcements. Meanwhile he sought to strengthen his position on the Great Harbour by oc- cupying and fortifying the headland of Plemmy- rium, which completely commanded its entrance, (/i. 4.) The Syracusans, however, still occupied the Olympieum (or Polichne, as it was sometimes called) with a strong body of troops, and having, under the guidance of Gylippus, attacked the Athe- nians both by sea and land, though foiled in the former attempt, they took the forts which had been recently erected on the Plemmyrium. (76. 4, 22 — 24.) This was a most important advantage, as it rendered it henceforth very ditficult for the Athenians to supply their fleet and camp with provisions; and it is evident that it was so regarded by both parties (77i. 25, 31) : the Syracusans also subsequently gained a decisive success in a sea-fight within the Great Harbour, and were preparing to push their advantage further, when the arrival of Demosthenes and Eurymedon from Athens with a powerful fleet restored for a time the superiority of the Athenians. Demosthenes immediately directed all his efforts to the capture of the Syracusan counterwork on Epi- polae; but meanwhile Gylippus had not neglected to strengthen his position there, by constructing three
 * The account here given of the Athenian ope-