Page:Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology (1870) - Volume 2.djvu/351

Rh HANNIBAL. submission of tlie Samnites, he pushed forward into Campania, and though foiled in the attempt to make himself master of Neapolis, which had been the immediate object of his advance, he was more than compensated by the acquisition of Capua (a city scarcely inferior to Rome itself in importance), the gates of which were opened to him by the popular party. Here, after reducing the small towns of Nuceria and Acerrae, he established his array in winter- quarters ; while he, at the same time, carried on the siege of Casilinura, a small but strong fortress in the immediate neighbourhood. (Liv. xxii. 58, 61, xxiii. 1—10, 14—18 ; Zonar. ix. 1, 2; Plut. Fab. 17.) Capua was celebrated for its wealth and luxury, and the enervating eifect which these produced upon the army of Hannibal became a favourite theme of rhetorical exaggeration in later ages. (Zonar. ix. 3 ; Florus, ii. 6.) The futility of such declamations is sufficiently shown by the simple fact that the superiority of that army in the field remained as decided as ever. Still it may be truly said that the winter spent at Capua, b. c. 216-215, was in great measure the turning point of Hannibal's fortune, and from this time the war assumed an altered character. The experiment of what he could effect with his single army had now been fully tried, and, notwithstanding all his vic- tories, it had decidedly failed ; for Rome was still unsubdued, and still provided with the means of maintaining a protracted contest. But Hannibal had not relied on his own forces alone, and he now found himself, apparently at least, in a condition to coivmence the execution of his long-cherished plan, — that of arming Italy itself against the Ro- mans, and crushing the ruling power by means of her own subjects. It was to this object that his attention was henceforth mainly directed ; and hence, even when apparently inactive, he was, in reality, occupied with the most important schemes, and busy in raising up fresh foes to overwhelm his antagonists. From this time, also, the Romans in great measure changed their plan of operations, and, instead of opposing to Hannibal one great army in the field, they hemmed in his move- ments on all sides, guarded all the most important towns with strong garrisons, and kept up an army in every province of Italy, to thwart the opera- tions of his lieutenants, and check the rising dis- position to revolt. It is impossible here to follow in detail the complicated movements of the subse- quent campaigns, during which Hannibal himself frequently traversed Italy in all directions, appear- ing suddenly wherever his presence was called for, and astonishing, and often baffling, the enemy by the rapidity of his marches. Still less can we ad- vert to all the successes or defeats of his generals, though these of necessity often influenced his own operations. All that we can do is, to notice very briefly the leading events which distinguished each successive campaign. But it is necessary to bear in mind, if we would rightly estimate the character and genius of Hannibal, that it was not only where he was present in person that his su- periority made itself felt : as Polybius has justly remarked (ix. 22), he was at once the author and the presiding spirit of all that was done in this war against the Roman power, — in Sicily and in Macedonia, as well as in Italy itself, from one ex- tremity of the peninsula to the other. The campaign of 215 was not marked by any VOL. II. HANNIBAL. 337 decisive events. Casilinum had fallen in the course of the winter, and with the advance of spring Plannibal took up his camp on Mount Tifata, where, while awaiting the arrival of rein- forcements from Carthage, he was at hand to sup- port his partisans in Campania, and oppose the Roman generals in that province. But his attempts on Cumae and Neapolis were foiled ; and even after he had been joined by a force from Carthage (very inferior, however, to what he had expected), he sustained a repulso before Nola, which was magni- fied by the Romans into a defeat. As the winter approached, he withdrew into Apulia, and took up his quarters in the plains around Arpi. But other prospects were already opening before him ; in his camp on Tifata he had received embassies from Philip, king of Macedonia, and Hieronyraus of Syracuse, both of which he had eagerly welcomed ; and thus sowed the seeds of two fresh wars, and raised up two formidable enemies against the Roman power. (Liv. xxiii. 19, 20, 30—39, 41 — 46 ; xxiv. 6 ; Plut. Marc. 10—12 ; Polyb. vii. 2, 9 ; Zonar. ix. 4.) These two collateral wars in some degree drew off the attention of both parties from that in Italy itself; yet the Romans still opposed to the Car- thaginian general a chain of armies which hampered all his operations ; and though Hannibal was ever on the watch for the opportunity of striking a blow, the campaign of 214 was still less decisive than that of the preceding year. Early in the summer he advanced from Apulia to his former station on Mount Tifata, to watch over the safety of Capua ; from thence he had descended to the Lake Avernus, in hopes of making himself master of Puteoli, when a prospect was held out to him of surprising the important city of Tarentum. Thither he hastened by forced marches, but arrived too late, — Tarentum had been secured by a Roman force. After this his operations were of little im- portance, until he again took up his winter-quarters in Apulia. (Liv. xxiv. 12, 13, 17, 20.) During the following summer (b. c 213), while all eyes were turned towards the war in Sicily, Hannibal remained almost wholly inactive in the neighbourhood of Tarentum, the hopes he still entertained of making himself master of that im- portant city rendering him unwilling to quit that quarter of Italy. Fabius, who was opposed to him, was equally inefficient ; and the capture of Arpi, which was betrayed into his hands, was the only advantage he was able to gain. But before the close of the ensuing winter Hannibal was rewarded with the long-looked-for prize, and Tarentum was betrayed into his hands by Nicon and Philemenus. The advantage, however, was still incomplete, for a Roman garrison still held possession of the cita- del, from which he was unable to dislodge them. (Polyb. viii. 26—36 ; Liv. xxiv. 44—47 ; xxv. 1, 8 — 11 ; Appian, Annib. 31—33.) The next year (212) was marked by important events. In Sicily, on the one hand, the fall of Syracuse more than counterbalanced the acquisition of Tarentum ; while in Spain, on the contrary, the defeat and death of the two Scipios [Hasdru- BAL, No. 6] seemed to establish the superiority jof Carthage in that country, and open the way to Hasdrubal to join his brother in Italy ; a movement which Hannibal appears to have been already long expecting. Meanwhile, the two consuls, em- boldened by the apparent inactivity of the Cartha-