Page:Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology (1870) - Volume 2.djvu/342

Rh 328 HAMILCAR. fleet the shores of Bruttiiim, suddenly landed on the north coast of Sicily, and established himself with his whole anny on a mountain named Hercte (now called Monte Pellegrino), in the midst of the enemy's country, and in the immediate neighbour- hood of Panormus, one of their most important cities. Here he succeeded in maintaining his ground, to the astonishment alike of friends and foes, for nearly three years. The natural strength of the position defied ail the efforts of the enemy, and a small, but safe and convenient, harbour at the foot of the mountain enabled him not only to secure his own communications by sea, but to send out squadrons which plundered the coasts of Sicily and Italy even as far north as Cumae. By land, meanwhile, he was engaged in a succession of almost continual combats with the Romans, which did not, indeed, lead to any decisive result, but served him as the means of training up a body of infantry which should be a match for that of Rome, Avhile he so completely paralysed the whole power of the enemy as to prevent their making any vigorous attempts against either Drepanum or Lilybaeum. So important did it appear to the Romans to expel him from his mountain fastness, that they are said to have at one time assembled a force of 40,000 men at the foot of the rock of Hercte. (Diod. Exc. Hoesch. xxiii. p. 506.) Yet Hamilcar still held out ; and when, at length, he relinquished his position, it was only to occupy one still more extraordinary and still more galling to the enemy. In 244 he abruptly quitted Hercte, and, landing suddenly at the foot of Mount Eryx, seized on the town of that name, the inhabitants of which he removed to Drepanum, and converted it into a fortified camp for his army. The Romans still held the fort on the summit of the mountain, while one of their armies lay in a strongly in- trenched camp at the foot of it. Yet in this still more confined arena did Hamilcar again defy all their exertions for two years more ; during which period he had not only to contend against the efforts of his enemies, but the disaffection and fickleness of the mercenary troops under his com- mand, especially the Gauls. In order to retain them in obedience, he was obliged to make them large promises, the difficulty of fulfilling which was said to have been afterwards one of the main causes of the dreadful war in Africa. (Polyb. i. QQ, ii. 7 ; Appian, Hisp. 4.) But while he thus con- tinued to maintain his ground in spite of all ob- stacles, the Romans, despairing of effecting any thing against him by land, determined to make one great effort to recover the supremacy by sea. A powerful fleet was sent out under Lutatius Catulus, and the total defeat of the Carthaginian admiral Hanno off the Aegates, in B. c. 241, de- cided the fiite of the war. [Hanno, No. 11 ; Ca- TULUS.] The Carthaginian government now re- ferred it to Hamilcar to determine the question of war or peace ; and seeing no longer any hopes of ultimate success, he reluctantly consented to the treaty, by which it was agreed that the Cartha- ginians should evacuate Sicily. Lutatius had at first insisted that the troops on Mount Eryx should lay down their arms ; but this was peremp- torily refused by Hamilcar, and the Roman con- sul was forced to, abandon the demand. Hamilcar descended with his army to Lilybaeum, where he immediately resigned the command, leaving it to Gisco to conduct the troops to Africa. (Polyb. i. HAMILCAR. 56 — 62, ^Q; Diod. Eocc. xxiv. ; Zonar. viii. 16, 17; Corn. Nep. Hamilc. 1.) He himself returned to Carthage, filled with im- placable animosity against Rome, and brooding over plans for future vengeance under more favourable circumstances. (Polyb. iii. 9 ) But all such pro- jects were for a time suspended b}"^ a danger nearer home. The great revolt of the mercenary troops, headed by Spendius and Matho, which broke out immediately after their return from Sicily, and in which they were quickly joined by almost all the native Africans, brought Carthage in a moment to the brink of ruin. Hamilcar was not at first em- ployed against the insurgents ; whether this arose from the predominance of the adverse party, or that he was looked upon as in some measure the author of the evils that had given rise to the insurrection, from the promises he had been compelled to make to the mercenaries under his command, and which there were now no means of fulfilling, we know not ; but the incapacity of Hanno, who first took the field against the rebels, soon became so appa- rent, that all parties concurred in the appointment of Hamilcar to succeed him. He found affairs in a state apparently almost hopeless : Carthage itself was not actually besieged, but all the passes which secured its communication with the interior were in the hands of the insurgents, who were also masters of all the open country, and were actively engaged in besieging Utica and Hippo, the only towns that still remained faithful to the Carthagi- nians. The forces placed at the disposal of Ha- milcar amounted to only 10,000 men and 70 elephants ; but with these he quickly changed the face of affairs, forced the passage of the river Ba- gradas, defeated the enemy with great slaughter, and re-opened the communications with the interior. He now traversed the open country unopposed, and reduced many towns again to the subjection of Carthage. On one occasion, indeed, he seems to have been surprised and involved in a situation of much difficulty, but was saved by the opportune accession of Naravas, a Numidian chief, with whose assistance he totally defeated the rebels under Spendius and Autaritus. Many captives having fallen into his hands on this occasion, Hamilcar treated them with the utmost lenity, receiving into his army all that were willing to enlist, and dis- missing the rest in safety to their homes, on con- dition of their not bearing arms against him again. But this clemency was so far from producing the desired effect, that it led Spendius and Matho, the leaders of the insurgents, from apprehension of the influence it might exercise upon their followers, to the most barbarous measures, and they put to death Gisco and all their other prisoners, in order, by this means, to put an end to all hopes of reconcili- ation or pardon. This atrocity drove Hamilcar to measures of retaliation, and he henceforth put to death, without mercy, all the prisoners that fell into his hands. (Polyb. i. 75 — 81 ; Diod. Exc. Vales. XXV. 2.) The advantages hitherto gained by Barca were now almost counterbalanced by the defection of Utica and Hippo ; and Hanno having been (for what reason we know not) associated with him in the command, the dissensions which broke out between the two generals effectually pre- vented their co-operating to any successful result. Thftse disputes were at length terminated by the Carthaginian government leaving it to the army to decide which of the two generals should resign,