Page:Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology (1870) - Volume 1.djvu/758

 same remark extends to all the philosophical writings, to pronounce that the reasonings employed by Cicero are to be taken as the expression of his own views. Here and elsewhere he always carefully guards himself against such an imputation ; his avowed object in every matter of controversy was merely to assist the judgment of the reader by stating fairly the strong points upon both sides of the question, scrupulously leaving the inference to be drawn by each individual, according to the impression produced. In the piece before us whatever may have been the private convictions of the author, it would have been little seemly in a member of that august college whose duty to the state consisted in presiding over and regulating augury to declare openly, that the whole of the discipline which he was required to enforce was a tissue of fraud and imposture; and Cicero above all others was the last man to be guilty of such a breach of public decency.

The scene of the conversation is the Lyceum in the Tusculanum of Cicero. The tract was composed after the death of Caesar, for that event is spoken of in the course of the debate.

Cicero appears to have consulted Chrysippus, who wrote several works upon this subject, especially a book entitled 🇬🇷, to have availed himself of the labours of Posidonius and Diogenes of Babylon 🇬🇷, and to have derived some assistance from Cratippus, Antipater, Plato, and Aristotle. In the second book he avowedly followed Carneades, and there is a reference (ii. 47) to Panaetius also. (See Kühner, p. 100.)

The Editio Princeps is included in the collection of Cicero's philosophical works, printed in 2 vols. fol., by Sweynheym and Pannartz, Rome, 1471. The edition of Davis, Camb. 8vo., 1721, containing the De Fato also, was for a long period the standard, but has now given way to that of Rath, Hal. 8vo., 1807, and especially to that superintended by Creuzer, Kayser, and Moser, 8vo., Frankf. 1828, which is superior to every other.

3. De Fato Liber Singularis.

A dialogue to complete the series upon speculative theology, of which the De Natura Deorum and the De Divinatione form the first two parts. (De Divin. ii. 1.) It is a confused and mutilated fragment on the subject of all others the most perplexing to unaided reason, the doctrine of predestination and its compatibility with free-will. The beginning and the end are wanting, and one if not more chasms break the continuity of what remains. We find it generally stated that the work consisted of two books, and that the whole or the greater portion of what has been preserved belongs to the second; but there is no evidence whatever to prove in what manner it was originally divided, nor do we know whether it was ever finished, although, judging from the careless style of the composition, we are led to infer that the author left his task incomplete. It would appear to have contained, or to have been intended to contain, a review of the opinions held by the chief philosophic sects upon Fate, or Destiny, the most prominent place being assigned to the Stoics—who maintained that Fate, or Destiny, was the great ruling power of the Universe, the 🇬🇷 or anima mundi, in other words, the Divine Essence from which all impulses were derived—and to the Academics, who conceived that the movements of the mind were voluntary, and independent of, or at least not necessarily subject to, external controul. The scene of conversation is the Puteolanum of Cicero, where he spent the months of April and May after the death of Caesar, the speakers being Cicero himself, and Hirtius, at that time consul-elect.

The De Fato has generally been published along with the De Divinatione ; all the editions of the latter, mentioned above contain it, and the same remarks apply.

4. De Auguriis — Auguralia.

Charisius quotes three words from a work of Cicero under the former title, Servius refers apparently to the same under the latter designation. We know nothing more upon the subject. (Charisius, i. p. 98, comp. p. 112; Serv. ad Virg. Aen. v. 737.)

2..

In oratory Cicero held a position very different from that which he occupied in relation to philosophy, whether we consider the amount of exertion and toil bestowed on each pursuit respectively, or the obstacles external and internal which impeded his advancement. Philosophy was originally viewed by him merely as an instrument which might prove useful in fabricating weapons for the strife of the bar, and in bestowing a more graceful form on his compositions. Even after he had learned to prize more fully the study of mental science, it was regarded simply as an intellectual pastime. But the cultivation of eloquence constituted the main business of his whole life. It was by the aid of eloquence alone that he could hope to emerge from obscurity, and to rise to wealth and honour. Upon eloquence, therefore, all his energies were concentrated, and eloquence must be held as the most perfect fruit of his talents.

Cicero was peculiarly fortunate in flourishing during the only epoch in the history of his country which could have witnessed the full development of his intellectual strength; had he lived fifty years earlier public taste would not have been sufficiently refined to appreciate his accomplishments, fifty years later the motive for exertion would have ceased to exist. In estimating the degree of excellence to which Cicero attained, we must by no means confine ourselves, as in the case of the philosophical works, to a critical examination of the speeches in reference to the matter which they contain, and the style in which they are expressed, for in an art so eminently practical the result gained is a most important element in the computation. Even had the orations which have come down to us appeared poor and spiritless, we should nevertheless have been justified in concluding, that the man who unquestionably obtained a mastery over the minds of his hearers, and who worked his way to the first offices of state by the aid of eloquence alone, must have been a great orator; while, on the other hand, we could not have pronounced such an opinion with confidence from a mere perusal of his orations, however perfect they may appear as writings, unless we possessed the assurance, that they were always suited to the ears of those who listened to them, and generally produced the effect desired. This being premised, we may very briefly glance at the merits of these works as literary compositions,