Page:Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology (1870) - Volume 1.djvu/360

Rh 342 ARISTOTELES. third book he develops the idea of the state ac- cording to its separation into different forms of government ; in the fourth book he considers the several constitutions according to their differences in kind, because these exercise an influence on legislation. For legislation is dependent on the conr stitution^ not vice versa. That is to say, constitution is the arrangement of the powers in the state, ac- cording to which the sovereignty (to Kvpiov) is determined. The constitution is thus the soid of the state. {Polit. iv. 1, iii. 4.) The laws, on the other hand, are the determining principles, accord- ing to which the governing body governs, and holds in check those who transgress them. Aristotle distinguishes aristocracy, kingdom, and republic (iroKiTeia ?) t^ koiv^ Trpoaayspsvo/xevr} dvofiari), and sets by the side of these the three perversions {^TrapeK§ouT€is) of them: oligarchy, tyranny, demo- cracy. These constitutions arise out of the three principles, 1, of equality, founded on the prepon- derance of number; 2, of inequality, which is founded either, a. on the preponderance of exter- nal strength and wealth (tyranny^ oligarchy), or b. on the preponderance of internal .or spiritual strength (monarchy, aristocracy). Aristotle then, in the 5th book, c«nsiders the disturbing and pre- serving causes in the different constitutions, always having regard to reality and experience (Polit. iii. 17, iv. 1) ; and, for the determination of that form of government which is best adapted for the great- est number of states, gets this result, that in it democratical and oligarchical principles mu&t be in- termixed and united. (Polit. iv. 12.) From such a mixture of the elements of constitutions result new forms of mixed constitutions (<TvvSva<Tnoi), which Aristotle characterizes more closely accord- ing to the three essential functions of political power. (Polit. iv. 14, vi) Having thus prepared the way, the philosopher proceeds to the real problem, to shew how a state can be so perfect- ly constituted, as to answer to the requisitions of human nature. He shews that the question. What is the best constitution ? is connected with the question. What is the most desirable mode of life ? (Polit. vii. 1 ) he develops the external conditions for the realisation of the best constitution (Polit. viL 4, &c.), which are dependent on fortune, — and then passes to the internal conditions of such a constitution, which are independent of fortune. (Polit. vii. 13, &c,) For these latter he finds the central point in tlie education of youth, which he therefore considers as a public concern of the state. (Polit. viii. 1.) Its object is the harmonious cul- ture of all the physical and mental powers, which lays the foundation for that hamiony of perfect virtue both in the man and in the citizen, in which the purely human develops itself in all its fulness and power. By the individual citizens of the state (Polit. vii. 13) being trained to a virtuous, moral life, virtue and morality become predominant in all the spheres of political life, and accordingly by means oi politics that is completely realised, for which ethics form the ground-work, viz. human happiness depending on a life in accordance with virtue. Thus on the one hand the science of poli- tics is again reflected to the point from which it started — ethics, while on the other hand, inasmuch as art and oratory are included in the circle of the means by which the citizen is to be trainf^d, it points beyond what is immediately connected with itself to the departments of ARISTOTELES. 3. Bhctoric and Aestlietica. 1. RMoric. — Here we need say but little; partly because the works of Aristotle, which relate to this subject, are more generally known and read than the properly philosophical writings, and partly because the subject itself is of considerably less difficulty. We therefore make only some general observations. Rhetoric stands side by side (avTlarpocpos) with dialectics, for both have to do with subjects, with which, as pertaining to no particular science, every one may make himself acquainted, and respecting which every one deems himself capable of forming a judgment. Every one considers himself, and is to a certain extent, an orator and dialectician. Rhetoric raises this routine to an artistic know- ledge, by means of tlieory, which arrives at the perception of the causes why, and the means by which, the orator, who has not been theoretically trained, attains his object. (Rliet. i. 1.) The kernel of such a theory is the argumentation by which conviction is produced. Enthymemes are the foundation (aufxa. Trjs iriaTews) of argu- mentation. Aristotle, as he himself says, first directed his attention to the fundamental prin- ciples of these. The ofject of Rnetoric is convic- tion, but its business (fpyov) consists in dis- covering that which awakens belief with respect to the subject in hand, (Rliet. i. 1, ov to irflaai cpyov aOTTJs, dWd TO iSeiv rd vndpxovra iridavd Trepl eKacTTov. Comp. QuintiL ii. 15, 13; Max. Schmidt de tempore quo ab Arid. liLri de arte rhet. ediii, p. 8, &c.) The means of proof (irioTds) therefore are what we are mainly concerned with. These are partly external (witnesses, &c.), partly artisticaU to be created by the orator ; to these belong the personal qualities (ijdos) of the orator himself, and the disposition of the hearers, and the mode itself in which the arguments are exhibited. From the means of proof we discover what is re- quisite in the orator : he must understand how to form condusions, must possess an insight into the moral nature and virtues of man, as well as ah acquaintance with the passions. (Rliet. ii. 22.) Accordingly rhetoric grows as it were out of the roots of dialectics and etliics. (i. 4.) For argu- mentation, example and enthymeme are in rhetoric, what induction and conclusion are in dialectics. As regards their subject matter, most enthjanemes are taken from the special departments of the sciences. In the laying down of the general and par- ticular points of view the excellence of the genuine empiricism of Aristotle, which is united with the most acute sagacity, amply displays itself, and, particulariy in the treatment of the irdQT], unfolds a rich treasure of psychological experience, which lays bare the most secret recesses of the human heart The several species of oratory develop themselves out of the different dispositions which may exist in the hearer of a speech. The hearer, namely, is either a ^ewg/o's, i. e. listens only for the sake of artistic enjoyment, or he is one who forms a judgment respecting what is to come, or what is past. In accordance with these different charac- ters in which the hearer appears, there result three species of oratory: the deliberative (ykvos av^Sovh-^xniKou), the forensic (7. ^ikolvikov), the epideictic (7. Ittl^^iktikov). Aristotle then deter- mines what are the essential elements of these species, and further the occasion and purposes of