Page:Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology (1870) - Volume 1.djvu/359

Rh ARTSTOTELKS. duces a pleasure^ which exercises a powerful influ- ence in urging the man on to virtuous activity, besides being the constant attendant of the latter. In this point of view Aristotle, in the 10th book (Elh. Nic. X. 1-6), treats of pleasure as a powerful means of virtue. After the principal elements of the definition of virtue have been thus gone through, the happiness of the theon^tical life of reason, i. e. of tlie life devoted to pliilosophical contemplation, is brought prominently into view ; which, as a divine kind of life, is accorded to but few men. {Eth. Nic. x. 8.) In contrast with this stands the Iiappiness of active, practical life, which has its firm basis in the ethical virtues, and in external good circum- stances the means of carrj'ing out and accomplish- ing the higher ends of life. 7%ts, however, can ouly htke phice IN the state ; and so Ethics of themselves conduct us to the doctrine of the state, to politics. The ethics of Aristotle preserved the most com- plete development of the doctrine of virtue, re- garded from the point of view chosen by the an- cients. The problem which he here proposed to himself was no other than this : to exhibit the good in the process of becomiiig, in that way in which it is a thing attainable by man, and indivi- dualizes itself most immediately in the bents or inclinations of men (the existence of which as such in their natural condition, according to the view taken by the ancients, cannot be denied). Then, secondly, by means of practical wisdom, to deter- mine the proper medium for these manifold bents, and so to lay down the rule for action. Farther, to shew that the obligation to live according to this rule, is founded in the essential nature of the higher rationality, and that in this those sentiments which are finn and immoveable form the immuta- ble basis of action. 2. Politics. The ethics of Aristotle contain the fundamental elements {(rroix^la, Polit. iv. 11, ed. Stahr) of politics, of which the former sci(nce is itself a particular part (ttoAiti/ctj t(s, Elh. Nic. i. 1, Magn. Mor. i. 1 .) Both have the same end — happiness, only that it is far more noble and more divine to conduct whole peoples and states to this end. {Po- lit. iii. 12.) Practical wisdom and politics are one and the same species of habit {Elh. Nic. vi. 8); all they differ in is this : that the object of the one is to promote the happiness of an individual, the olijoct of the other to promote that of a community. In the latter point of view, practical wisdom is: o. Tiie management of the family — oeconomics. 6. In the management of the state. — o. Legislative jiower {I'OfxoOfTiKu^), which regulates the general Tchiihna {dpxiTeKTOVLKt^). $. Administrative poiver {ttoMtiio'i) in the government of the state, where action, or the special application of the laws under particular circumstances, is concerned. The admi- nistrative power realizes itself first in that part of the state which deliberates on the public concerns (^ouAeirriKT)), and which possesses the power of applying the laws to j)ublic relations ; secondly, in the judicial power (Si/ccmtti/ctj), with the applica- tion of the laws to private concerns. As the highest good is something absolutely perfect, i. e. a thing of such a nature that it is striven after purely for its own sake, happiness, as it is a good of this kind, cannot be imperfect, but the quality of self-sufficiency {mhaoKtia) must ARISTOTELES. Ui pertain to it. This, however, is to be obtained not in isolated or family life, but only in the state, which is the union of all other circles of social life. Man therefore, as a being created by nature for the state and for life in the state (fcSov ttoKi- tik6u, Polit. I. 2, iii. 6, and elsewhere), strives after it The state, moreover, as a totality con- sisting of organically connected members, is by nature prior to the individual and the family ; it is the absolute prius. As the hand of a corpse is no mope a hand, so the anniiiilation of .the state is at the same time the annihilation of the individual; for only a wild beast or a god can live out of the bounds of the state, or without it. (Polit. i. 2, extr.) It is only through the state that avTopKfia, self- sufficiency, not merely for the preservation of bare life, but also for happy life,, is rendered possible. Happiness, however, is only the consequence of an activity of the soul consisting in complete virtue (ap6T7j) ; consequently, in the state, and in nothing short of it, does virtue itself attain complete reality. And the object of the political art is the most ho- nourable, in as far as the statesman directs all his care to the training of such citizens as are morally good and actively promote everything honourable and noble. {Eth. i. 10,13, ink.} The science of politics therefore is the necessary completion of ethics, and it is only in reference to the state that the latter can attain its full development. The two sciences, therefore, in Aristotle's view, stand in such close connexion, that in the Politics by irpoTfpov he refers to the Ethics, and in the latter by varepov to the Pohtics. According to the method of genetic develop- ment {Kara T-fju v(pT]yT)jj.4vru fxeOoSov, Polit. i. 1 ), Aristotle begins in the politics with the considera- tion of the first and most bimple human associa- tion, the family {oiKia). A marriage of free men and women is known only by the Hellenes, not by the barbarians, among whom not free men and women, but male and female slaves unite them- selves together. The distinction between Hellenes and barbarians, free men and slaves, in Aristotle's view is still a primary distinction, because the natural determining circumstance of birth (as Hellen or barbarian) is still an essential element in the idea of freedom. Christianity first laid down the principle^, that freedom is founded on the spiritual entity of man, without regard to the na- tural determining circumstance of birth. Out of the component parts of the family (slaves and free persons, master and slaves, man and wife, father and children) arise three relations: the despotic {Sea-jroTiKTJ), nuptial {yafitic^), and parental {reKVOTroniTiKTj ), with which is associated besides the oiKovofitKi^. These Aristotle treats of in the first book of the Politics. The arrangement of the whole domestic system resembles monarchy {Polit. i. 7), but at the same time the family is the image of political life generally, for in it lie the germs of friendship, constitution, and all that is just. {Eth. Eiulem. vii. 10, p. 1242. 6, Bekk.) After this, in the second book, he considers the pm-jiose of the state, as the unity of a whole con- sisting of mutually dependent and connected mem- bers, with reference as well to imaginary (PLnto), as to actually existing constitutions. He calls attention to their points of superiority and inferi- ority, and so indicates the essential conditions, which are necessary for the foundation and realisa- tion of the idea of a state. Thereupon in thQ